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I. INTRODUCTION
We are engaged in an immense, ongoing dispute, one between
those who own valuable copyrights and those who do not. To call it a
war is overstating the case a little, but only a little. The copyright-rich
content industry, fearing the worst from digital technology and believ-
ing its back is to the wall, is engaging in tactics more brutal than anyone
thought likely even just a few years ago. The copyright-poor, including
consumers, new authors, and those whose business is developing and
exploiting works in the public domain, have steadily lost ground over
the last few years and, also believing their backs are to the wall, are
resorting to guerilla tactics including the plainly illicit distribution of
files via peer-to-peer ("P2P") technology. How odd that copyright law,
which for most of the last century was an arcane backwater, of interest
chiefly to the few lawyers practicing in the faintly disreputable areas of
entertainment and publishing, has become such a battleground. The
announcement by the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") that it intends to file "thousands" of lawsuits1 against indi-
vidual users of P2P technology has focused public attention 2 on copy-
right in a way never seen before. Today, copyright is more visible than
it has ever been in its nearly 300-year history, and the battles between
the copyright-rich and copyright-poor are coming to resemble a class
war. Unlike the "usual" class war, in which the differences among the
combatants are based on ownership of tangible property, this war is
over intangible rights. Nevertheless, the conflict can be understood as
one between haves and have-nots, and the stakes are high. Control
over burgeoning digital technology is at issue, as are basic rights of ac-
cess to information and to use copyrighted works.
During the early years of mass digital technology, two factors (one
new, one not) worked together to increase copyright's visibility. First-
and this factor was not new-copyright has always protected the con-
tent (text, images, music, video) that is distributed via the internet and
1 See Steve Lohr, Fighting the Idea that All the Internet is Free, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2003,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/09/technology/09FREE.html (last visited Sep-
tember 11, 2003).
2 The author has copies of 46 stories from the New York Times alone directly addressing
the recording industry's litigation, between May 2, 2003, when the newspaper reported that
the first four defendants settled their cases, and September 25, 2003.
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by other digital technologies. Second, in 1980, Congress accepted 3 the
recommendation of the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") 4 and determined that com-
puter programs 5 should be protected 6 under the Copyright Act of 1976
(the "Copyright Act"). 7 Thus, the works of Microsoft and Oracle
joined those of Twain and Melville as "literary works" for copyright
purposes. 8 So, even as copyright protects the content being distributed,
it protects the code-the computer programs-that make digital distri-
bution possible.
3 Pub.L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117) (2000).
4 See National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Re-
port (1978), available at http://www.digital-law-online.info/CONTU/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2003).
1 Coinputer programs are defined as "a set of statements or instructions to be used di-
rectly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
6 For a critical look at CONTU's decision to protect computer programs with copyright,
see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Com-
puter Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663. Code is functional, and
protecting the "expression" within code is a bit like protecting the "expression" in a bridge.
Both code and bridges can be beautiful, but beauty is not the touchstone for copyright pro-
tection, which requires original expression. See id. at 742 (citing Apple Computer Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 823 (D.C. Pa. 1982); Muller v. Triborough
Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). In both cases, bridges and code, beauty
is subservient to (and perhaps arises from) function. As a functional object, any expression
in "code"-or in a bridge-is very different from the expression in a novel, poem or play.
The extension of copyright to functional objects, and the unwillingness of copyright lawyers
to confront the implications of that extension, contribute to copyright's incoherence.
7 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000).
8 One could argue, of course, that software bears no closer a resemblance to literature, or
indeed to anything else an ordinary citizen would think of as "literary," than it does to ballet.
But software, like literature, is capable of being written down, and this is enough to make it
literary for copyright purposes. "'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords,
film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Although
the Copyright Act does not specify that a computer program is to be protected as a literary
work, that is the category under which computer programs, whether source or object code,
are protected. (For a discussion of source and object code, see Samuelson, supra note 6, at
682-86 nn.69-79 and accompanying text). The House Report on the Copyright Act suggests
that computer programs are to be considered literary works: "The term 'literary works' does
not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directo-
ries, and similar factual, reference, or instructional works and compilations of data. It also
includes computer data bases and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate au-
thorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas
themselves." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248-49 3d Cir. (1983).
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Copyright thus protects both the distribution technology and the
distributed content. Moreover, because both software9 and content10
have become economic heavyweights, copyright has been elevated to a
significance that would have seemed improbable even twenty years
ago. Of course, copyright has long been important to the entertain-
ment and media industries, who, together with their lawyers and lobby-
ists, have focused a great deal of attention on it over the years. What is
new, however, is its significance in the everyday lives of the public.
And in this case, a little attention from the public is long overdue.
Since 1909, copyright law has been negotiated among representa-
tives of copyright-owning and copyright-using industries (often, the
owners in one context are the users in another), sometimes with a little
input from librarians or other representatives of non-profit groups, con-
sumer electronics manufacturers, and others whose businesses depend
upon creating or using copyrighted works. The public, which is ex-
pected and encouraged to use copyrighted works (and thus to generate
revenue for copyright owners), is not included in these negotiations. In
the past, excluding the public didn't seem to be a problem, because
even though in theory copyright exists to benefit the public,1 ' copy-
9 In 2002, the American software industry accounted for approximately $221.9 billion in
revenue, or about 2.2% of the nation's Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). Market Share
Reporter: Largest Software Firms (13th ed. 2003) available at http://www.lexis.com/research/
retrieve/frames? m=7745ee2373f9eeed10c6f00clld3c05e&csvc=BL&cform=BOol&_fmtstr=
XCITE&docnum=l&_startdoc=l&wchp=DGLbVtb-zSkAA&_md5=DB3623dbcf6ae54cb
482bf7a256caf8 (last visited Aug. 9, 2003).
10 Content, for its part, accounted for revenue of about $433.7 billion, or 4.3% of the
GDP. Keith Kupferschmid, Fighting Software Piracy Through the Law, Technology, Educa-
tion and Licences (2002), available at http://www.softsummit.com/b2_SIIA.pdf (last visited
Sept. 15, 2003). The content industry itself claims that the "copyright industries constitute
five percent of the Gross Domestic Product and copyrighted works are the largest single
United States export." Letter of Cary H. Sherman, President, Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America, to Sen. Norm Coleman, Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://
www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/_files/081403riaaresponseltr.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
11 "The monopoly created by copyright ... rewards the individual author in order to
benefit the public." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984)
(dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). "Encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added).
"[T]he ultimate aim [of copyright] is... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). "The sole inter-
est of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932), quoted in 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2001) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. James Madison wrote
that in the case of copyright, the "public good fully coincides ... with the claims of individu-
als." THE FEDERALIST 43. Copyright accomplishes its public benefit by granting a tempo-
rary monopoly on works of authorship to the author. The author can thereby (for a limited
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right's workings were largely invisible to those outside the copyright
industries. The law worked silently in the background, providing incen-
tives for the creation of works of authorship which, in the fullness of
time, became the common property of everyone. The lack of public
representation, however, did produce some odd side effects. For exam-
ple, the Copyright Act includes almost nothing addressing the rights of
the public to use copyrighted works. This is unusual for a statute that
spells out copyright owner's rights in broad, inclusive language and pre-
cisely and narrowly carves out the rights of (industry) users. The few
provisions that exist seem almost accidental; the first sale doctrine, for
instance, which says that the owner of a legally-made copy may "dis-
pose of the possession of that copy" without the copyright owner's per-
mission,12 expands the scope of permitted activity by permitting
members of the public to lend copies to their neighbors. But it seems
to be aimed more at libraries than at the public at large.
For a long time-for most of the last century, in fact-this was not
a problem. Members of the public weren't being sued, or threatened
with lawsuits, by content owners, so it didn't really matter that their
rights weren't spelled out clearly, or at all. But as digital technology
has advanced, the public has for the first time been able to obtain con-
tent in ways that bypass the content industry. Today, lawsuits against
the public for copyright infringement are a reality.
Two years ago, just as the possibility of widespread copyright litiga-
tion against the public was beginning to take shape, two books were
published, each addressing copyright policy and each aimed at a gen-
eral audience. Jessica Litman's Digital Copyright 3 is a masterful study
of the American copyright law in the last 100 years, and Siva Vaidhy-
period of time) extract monopoly rents, which in turn can subsidize the creation of more
works. When the author licenses the publication of a work to a publisher, the latter becomes
the beneficiary of the copyright law and the sole source for the work, which (in at least some
cases) subsidizes the distribution of works to the public. No significant amount of money is
earned, and thus no significant economic incentive is created, until the work is made accessi-
ble to the public. It has been true historically that some members of the public subsidize
these activities more than do others; that is, some will purchase copies, while others seek out
the work in places where it may be accessed for free (for example, in a library). Copyright
law has tolerated this because the public is its intended beneficiary; copyright ultimately
exists to benefit the public, not the author. Thus it is no accident that the owner of a legally-
made copy is permitted to lend it to others; this is one way by which the public captures an
immediate benefit from the copyright monopoly. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). And it
bears repeating that the monopoly is temporary: Once the work falls into the public domain,
it may be used and re-used without having to seek permission or pay a fee.
12 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
13 JEssicA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) [hereinafter DIGITAL COPYRIGHT].
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anathan's Copyrights and Copywrongs14 is a cultural history of copy-
right in America over roughly the same period. In part, the purpose of
this article is to review both books, and make the case that their con-
tents are important to everyone affected by copyright-that is to say, to
everyone. But it has a number of other aims, too. In Part II, it briefly
addresses some foundational ideas of copyright, and shows how digi-
tization has to a large extent invalidated certain of the assumptions on
which copyright has been based for the last 400 years. This leads to the
content industry's struggle to maintain its business model in the face of
an unprecedented threat, one which is highly dangerous to the public
interest. In Part III, it addresses Litman's and Vaidhyanathan's books
and describes what they contribute to understanding of copyright, both
for the public and for copyright professionals. Finally, in Part IV, it
considers developments in copyright since Litman's and Vaidhy-
anathan's books were published, placing the events of the last three
years in the context of the patterns revealed by these two authors.
II. FROM CONTENT CONTAINERS TO CONTAINERLESS CONTENT
A. Copyright Foundations
American federal copyright is specifically authorized by the Con-
stitution, which provides that, "Congress shall have the power ... to
promote the progress of science .. .by securing to authors . . .for
limited times, the exclusive right to their writings .... 5
There are three important points that even a cursory look at this
Constitutional language will reveal. First, Congress is given the power
to accomplish something, "to promote the progress of science," by leg-
islating in a particular way-"by securing [exclusive rights] to authors
for limited times." Second, the rights are given to authors; it is this that
defines copyright. 16 An author's economic rights are freely transfera-
ble,17 however, and the most-common scenario is that authors transfer
some or all of them to an entity (for example, a publisher, film distribu-
tor, or music recording company) with access to the channels of distri-
14 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) [hereinafter COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS].
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16 Copyright-like rights that are not conditioned upon authorship are often called "neigh-
boring" rights. These are a class of rights, common in Europe, much less so in the U.S., that
resemble copyright but inhere in entities that arguably lack a claim to authorship, for exam-
ple radio broadcasters, performers, and others. See S.M. Stewart, INTERNATIONAL COPY-
RIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS, § 7.15 (2d ed. 1989).
17 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "transfer of copyright ownership"), 201(d)(1) (own-
ership of copyright may be transferred "in whole or in part") (2000).
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bution. Finally, the term of copyright is limited. 18 In light of the
Constitution, copyright can be understood as a limited monopoly inter-
est ("exclusive right") that the government bestows ("Congress shall
have the power") on authors, with a view to stimulating the production
of creative expression ("promote the progress of science"). Congress
has no power under the Constitution to adopt copyright laws that ex-
ceed this Constitutional authorization.
The current American copyright statute is the Copyright Act of
1976, as amended. 19 At its inception, the Act gave the author certain
exclusive rights,20 which were the right to: (1) make copies; (2) make
adaptations; (3) publicly distribute copies; (4) publicly perform; and (5)
publicly display the work.21 These rights were broad enough that,
taken together, they were almost-with two notable exceptions-the
entire set of rights needed to commercially exploit the author's work.
The first exception, that is, the first "missing right," is the right to dis-
tribute the work after its first sale (for example, to lend it or resell it).
Under the "first sale doctrine," this right is reserved to the owner of a
lawful copy, who may "sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy" 22 in any way she sees fit. This is why the video rental indus-
18 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). Nevertheless, in Eldred, the
Supreme Court held that a copyright term that lasts through 99.8% of the economic value of
the copyright is not perpetual: "It is doubtful, however, that those architects of our Nation,
in framing the 'limited Times' prescription, thought in terms of the calculator rather than the
calendar." 537 U.S. at 210 n.16; 123 S. Ct. at 784 n.16.
19 See supra note 5.
20 The rights given to authors by American copyright have steadily expanded. The first
American copyright statute gave authors only the rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing
and vending." Act of May 31, 1790, ch.15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, quoted in DIGITAL COPYRIGHT,
supra note 13, at 32 n.2 (2001). As Professor Litman points out, in an age when the only
means of exploiting works was the sale of copies, this worked well enough, but as soon as
other means of exploitation became possible and commonplace, additional rights were
needed. Id. at 22-23.
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (2000). The right conferred by section 106(6) was added in
1995. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
22 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). A word of caution is in order, however. The first sale doc-
trine applies only to "owners" of lawfully-made copies. Id. This excludes virtually all
software and internet content, which is licensed rather than sold. See infra note 198. In
addition, sound recordings and computer programs may not be "dispos[ed] of... by rental,
lease or lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease or lending." 17
U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000). One key right was added since 1976, in partial recognition of
the role digital technology would ultimately play. This is the right of digital performance in
sound recordings, added in 1995 at the behest of the recording industry. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(6). As has become common, especially for recent amendments to the Act, the section
106(6) right, as a whole, is a composite of a broad right and several highly complex, specific
exceptions. The right of section 106(6) is conferred in only 19 words. The exceptions, con-
tained in section 114, require 7,316 words. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)-(j) (2000).
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try (and libraries) can exist without paying royalties.2 3 The second ex-
ception is that owners of copyright in sound recordings (generally
speaking, record companies) did not have an exclusive right of public
performance in their works.2 4 Musical works, however, do carry a pub-
lic performance right, and so when sound recordings embodying musi-
cal works were performed publicly, the copyright owners of musical
works (the songwriters and publishers) received compensation while
the record companies did not.2 5 Finally, none of these exclusive rights
under copyright extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, meth-
ods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries.2 6
Since 1976, Congress has not abridged any of these rights. How-
ever, in 1995, it added one right, the digital performance right in sound
recordings. 27 By the mid-1990s, technology presaged a future in which
record companies would become entirely obsolete. To understand this,
imagine a world in which musical content can be selected and listened
to without ever purchasing a tangible object. Now imagine that this can
be done in your home, at work, in your car, while jogging, and any-
where else you might want to do it. In such a world, record companies
would be unnecessary, because no one would need to possess their
products in order to listen to music. The delivery of audio perform-
ances on request would doubtlessly be a "public performance," 2 but
before 1995 such a performance was not compensable to the record
company. Record companies made their money by selling copies, not
23 Since the late 1990s, however, video rental enterprises typically enter into revenue-
sharing arrangements with the owners of video content (that is, movie studios), notwith-
standing that the Copyright Act does not require the content owner's permission. See David
Pogue, The File-Sharing Debates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
10/09/technology/circuits/09POGUE-EMAIL.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003). Such agree-
ments could be useful to video rental enterprises for many reasons, including access to broad
selection, early releases, and favorable pricing.
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2000).
2 See id. § 106(4) ("in the case of ... musical ... works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly"). On the distinction between sound recordings and musical works, see Niels B.
Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WiLLIAM MITCHELL L.
REV. 1001, 1011-13 (2002).
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st
Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
27 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336. See Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "to perform or display a work 'publicly"') para. 2
(2000):
To perform.., a work 'publicly' means... (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance .. .of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance... receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
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from public performances. 29 The advent of such a "celestial jukebox"
would make record companies superfluous, and so the 1995 legislation
made a digital public performance a royalty-generating event for the
owner of copyright in the sound recording.30 In this way, the celestial
jukebox would generate some revenue for an industry that currently
has a large stake in the public consumption of music.
But, in hindsight, the new legislation was too-far ahead of its time.
While it offered some protection against the relatively distant future
and the advent of music-on-demand-anywhere, it did little to shield re-
cord companies from the short-term changes that were already gaining
momentum. These were faster, and in some ways more profound, than
the industry realized: content was separating from the containers in
which it historically had been packaged. Until the late 1990s, it was
more or less impossible for the public to acquire content without ac-
quiring some tangible object in which the content was embedded. Digi-
tal technology is changing that, and the change will be permanent. The
next section will examine the phenomenon of containerless content and
its counterpart, digital distribution.
B. Containerless Content and Digital Distribution
Historically, content was closely identified with the material object
in which the content was embodied.31 People referred to a "book," and
29 Of course, record companies had no objection in principle to being compensated for
public performances of their sound recordings. However, their desire for such a royalty was
counterbalanced by the broadcast industry's equally ardent desire not to pay such a royalty,
and no such right found its way into the Copyright Act until digital technology threatened
record companies raison d'etre.
[Tihe Committee has sought to address the concerns of record producers ... regarding
the effects that new digital technology and distribution systems might have on their core
business without upsetting the longstanding business and contractual relationships
among record producers ... and broadcasters that have served ... these industries well
for decades. Accordingly, the Committee has chosen to create a carefully crafted and
narrow performance right, applicable only to certain digital transmissions of sound
recordings.
S. Rep. No. 104-128, at 17 (1995).
30 More detail on the compromise leading to the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 can be found in Schaumann, supra note 25, at 1014-17.
31 The identification between content and container is so strong that some argue that
copyright actually protects the container. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. LAW 27, 40 (2000) ("copyright in fact protect[s] only the physical
embodiments of. . . creativity"); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED *2
(March 1994), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2003) ("the bottle was protected, not the wine"). Indeed, copyright
does not attach until a work has been "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2000). Nevertheless, to say that copyright attaches to the container rather than the
content pushes the identification between content and container too far. The fixation re-
quirement is merely a condition of protecting the work; the medium does not thereby be-
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meant the physical aggregation of paper, cardboard, cloth, thread and
ink, as well as the literary work that was manifested within its physical
envelope. Much the same can be said of most other kinds of works, for
example CD's, photographs, paintings, and so on. Reproducing and
distributing content containers was the function of the publishing indus-
try. Copyright infringement was limited in part by the difficulty of re-
producing and distributing content's physical containers. 32 The
elements of tedium and nuisance, 33 as well as the inaccessibility to most
people of the industrial materials and processes needed to make con-
tent containers, made personal, noncommercial infringement necessa-
rily a small-scale and economically insignificant activity. In addition,
the mechanical processes involved in reproducing analog containers
(for example, recording an audio- or videotape) ensured that copies
made from copies would degrade. After only a few generations, copies
became unacceptably garbled. The fact that high-quality copies could
be made only from the original or, perhaps, from a first-generation
copy limited the ability of infringing copies to spread. Copyright law
took these practical difficulties for granted, functioning side-by-side
with them to protect the content industry. While personal, noncom-
mercial infringement was in theory actionable, lawsuits were usually re-
served for sellers of counterfeit copyrighted goods and large-scale
commercial infringers; the former was limited by the practical difficul-
ties of container copying and distribution. The intangible work and the
tangible embodiment of the work were closely identified, and copyright
law no less than the population at large incorporated that identification
and assumed it would always be so.
But the congruence of content and container lasted only until the
widespread adoption of digital technology. Digitization of content is
rapidly divorcing content from its previously inescapable material em-
come the object of protection. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 202 (ownership of a copyright is distinct from
ownership of a work's container). The discussion itself, however, is powerful testimony to
the close identification between container and content. It is noteworthy that in most civil
law countries, there is no fixation requirement; copyright can exist even in unfixed (and
therefore entirely containerless) works. See Stewart, supra note 16, § 4.05 ("In [civil law]
jurisdictions a lecture given without a script or a musical performance of a work without a
score is protected .... [T]he Berne Convention (1971) does not take sides .... ).
32 See DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 171 ("Newsstands turn out to be an effec-
tive way of marketing newspapers and magazines in part because it is difficult as a practical
matter to make and distribute additional copies of newpapers and magazines that one buys
from the newsstand.").
31 Stephen Manes, Surfing and Stealing: An Author's Perspective, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 127, 133 (1999) ("A few years ago, when Ricoh announced a copying machine that
turned the pages of books automatically, Paul Aiken, [executive director of the Authors
Guild], was quoted as saying that it 'removed the tedium from copyright infringement."').
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bodiment. Books, music, movies-all forms of content are being liber-
ated from the material objects that were historically necessary to read,
listen to or view the content they captured. And this separation of con-
tent from container is dramatically changing the way we think about
content. Content can now be copied without the need to reproduce its
container, 34 and containerless digital content presents few of the practi-
cal obstacles to copying that limit infringement of analog containers. A
click of the mouse, and a copy is made. And digital copying is accurate
to a degree not possible in the analog domain: it is effectively genera-
tionless. A copy of a copy of a copy is indistinguishable from the origi-
nal.35 This point bears repeating: digital, containerless content is
trivially easy to copy, and the copies are generationless. This greatly
facilitates personal, noncommercial copying, as well as large-scale, or-
ganized piracy.
It seems hard to imagine a more threatening series of develop-
ments for the content industry, at least as far as copying is concerned.
But even more dangerous-and more revolutionary-than changes in
copying technology were changes in the technology for content distri-
bution. The content industry's business model is based on dominating
distribution channels.36 Content must be distributed before it has eco-
34 Digital content, of course, still needs to be stored in something, but the containers are
generic (e.g., hard disks), and they do not have to be reproduced when the content is repro-
duced. I may need a disk on which to store the content you emailed to me, but I don't need
a copy of your disk. And the process of emailing (that is, distributing) the content to me
takes place through a digital pipe; no container need ever change hands.
11 This in itself poses a formidable threat to the content industry. When generationless
digital copying first became available to consumers (in the form of digital audiotape
("DAT") equipment), the music industry banded together and threatened to sue the first
U.S. importer of consumer DAT technology. See Schaumann, supra note 25, at 1008-10. A
lawsuit was in fact filed, precipitating inter-industry negotiations that resulted in a compro-
mise: The content industry agreed to permit DAT technology, on the condition that its abil-
ity to make generationless copies was eliminated. Id.
36 Loosely speaking, while creation is the function of an author, distribution is the func-
tion of a publisher. The content industry is principally a publishing enterprise; it has never
been able to dominate the creation of works. While the industry can provide access to the
latest technologies of creation, and that is always nice, creation does not depend on it. Most
authors continue to work off the payrolls of American content providers, which purchase or
license the creative fruit of the authors' work. American copyright provides incentives for
both creation and distribution. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06, 123 S.Ct. 769,
781 (2003); Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("copy-
right supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate" works of authorship). In
order to encourage distribution, American copyright assures exclusivity and thus monopoly
pricing during the life of the copyright. The fact that distribution technology for con-
tainerless works is so cheap has led some to conclude that copyright protection for distribu-
tion is no longer justifiable. E.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 263
(2002). Even the creation of certain new works, for example sound recordings, has become
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nomic value; consumers don't pay for what they can't access. And as
long as content was available only in physical containers, access to the
distribution channels required doing business with the content indus-
try.37 The content industry had access to manufacturing facilities,
trucks that could haul tons of product, warehouses, relationships with
wholesalers and retailers, sales forces, marketing budgets, and all the
other essentials of a national distribution enterprise. Foreign distribu-
tion historically was left to foreign entities, because product distribu-
tion requires a substantial local presence. These foreign distributors
were sometimes, but not always, affiliated with their U.S. counterparts.
Containerless content changes all this. The distributor of con-
tainerless content needs only a digital pipe through which the content
can be pushed. The essential attribute of a distribution channel for
containerless content is bandwidth (referring to the amount of data that
can be pushed through a digital connection in a unit of time), rather
than trucks, warehouses, and huge capital investments. In the begin-
ning (say, 10 years ago) bandwidth was still fairly expensive, relative to
container-bound content, and so the content industry's distribution oli-
gopoly maintained its competitive advantage. Internet time, however,
passes quickly. Today, anyone who can afford to pay $50 a month can
obtain enough bandwidth to distribute large amounts of content world-
wide, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Because the cost is so low, it
can be (and is being) done without any profit motive, something un-
heard of before digital technology. In other words, the impact of con-
tainerless content is to reduce to zero the marginal cost of distributing a
relatively small number of copies. Personal, noncommercial distribu-
tion is free of charge. On a commercial scale, digital distribution re-
quires dedicated servers and much more bandwidth than what is
available for most personal internet connections, as well as marketing,
much cheaper. It is now possible to make a high-quality digital recording on equipment that
is available for under $30,000. See id. at 306. While that relatively small investment will not
purchase the latest or best technology, it is adequate for a professional result.
37 This is the reason that a "distribution deal" was (and still is) highly sought-after by
musicians and film-makers. One can make the record (or the movie), but if it isn't in stores
or on screens no one will ever know about it. See Music Distribution for Independent Artists
& Labels, available at http://www.musicdistribution.com (last visited August 11, 2003); Q&A
With Kenny Love: The Elusive Pressing and Distribution Deal, at http://www.musicbizacad-
emy.com/comment/kloveqa3.html (last visited August 11, 2003); Music Distribution, at http://
www.nzmusic.org.nz/pag.cfm?i=495) (last visited August 11, 2003); Schuyler M. Moore, Dis-
tribution Agreements, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 369
(John David Viera, et al., eds., 1998-99); Michael L. Maddren, Choice of Entity and Securities
Aspects of Independent Film Offerings by First-Time Filmmakers, 22 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 65, 91 (1999) ("Since distribution is such a crucial factor in a film's success, the fact
that a filmmaker does not have a distribution agreement, as well as the fact that he may be
forced to deal with an independent distribution company, should be disclosed to offerees.").
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advertising, and relationships. Commercial digital distribution isn't
free, but personal distribution is.
Digitization, with its combination of generationless copying and
containerless distribution, is thus profoundly subversive of the content
industry's business model.38 In fact, digitization makes it possible for
consumers to replicate most of the content industry's value proposi-
tion-easily accessible, high-quality content, with minimal (or no) re-
strictions on use39-at a price approaching zero.40 Surprisingly, the
content industry apparently didn't see this coming. 41 The music busi-
ness paid little attention to the new technology until Napster, the first
widely-accepted (and illegal) P2P distribution network,42 appeared and
18 See Lionel S. Sobel, DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 667-68 (2003) ("Unauthorized digital reproduction and distri-
bution have shattered traditional music industry business models and are on the verge of
doing the same to movie industry models.").
39 Fearing widespread piracy, the content industry attempted to limit the ability of con-
sumers to use digital works, by preventing copying, transferring to other devices, eliminating
access when subscriptions expire, and other similar strategies. Although these measures are
both technologically feasible and are legally backed up by the anti-circumvention provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"), see 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000),
they ultimately failed, because consumers showed no interest in the limited-use content the
industry was supplying. Later, when Apple Computer introduced its iTunes service, which
offered a large catalog of material, with few restrictions on use, consumers responded favor-
ably, downloading more than five million works in the first eight weeks, all at a time when
only Macintosh users-a small fraction of the total number of internet users-could make
use of the service. See John Zahlaway, New Music-Download Service sets Sights on Windows
Users, LrVEDAILY, at http://www.livedaily.com/news/5246.html (July 22, 2003) (last visited
Sept. 17, 2003). The value of the industry's product is thus linked to the freedom with which
the consumer can use the digital work.
I There are other important sources of added value from the content industry; for exam-
ple locating talent and bankrolling initial creative ventures (such as recording music, shoot-
ing a movie, writing a book). Often, however, these functions are carried out by smaller
companies. If successful, the project becomes a party to a distribution contract, see supra
note 37, with an international content company. In such an arrangement, the international
content company distributes the content to agreed-upon markets, in exchange for a percent-
age of sales. The largest content companies (in the music industry, the "Big Five"-AOL
Time Warner, Bertelsmam, EMI Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Universal Music
Group) are also the ones most tied to distribution, and therefore most threatened by digital
reproduction and distribution.
41 In addition to overlooking the potential markets created by digital technology, the mu-
sic industry in 1992 negotiated a legislative compromise that confounded containers with
content, thereby leaving MP3 files out of the definition of "digital musical recordings." Au-
dio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)); see also Recording Industry Ass'n v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999); see infra notes 50-69 and accompanying
text.
42 P2P technology reconfigures the typical model of information storage and retrieval.
Non-P2P networks involve a "one-to-many" distribution model, in which a central server
stores information and transmits it to user on request. P2P is a "many-to-many" model, in
which the information is stored locally with a user who permits others users to search his or
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forced the industry to take digital distribution seriously. Hollywood,
too, was passive until it saw the impact of P2P distribution on the music
business. 43 The content industry missed its first, crucial window of op-
portunity to get high-quality, legal digital distribution services in front
of consumers. Had they done so, many consumers might have chosen
legal services over illegal ones. Instead, the legal digital services record
companies provided were too little, too late.44 And worse still, the
post-Napster generation of illegal P2P services has proven to be ex-
tremely difficult to close down. 45
C. The Vanishing Rights of the Public
P2P distribution eventually forced the content industry to recog-
nize the impact of containerless distribution. The industry responded
with an all-out assault on the enabling digital technology. Industry lob-
byists requested, and Congress enacted, the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act of 1998 ("DMCA"), 46 a law restricting technology that can be
her hard disk and retrieve desired information. Each user of a P2P network can be a storage
point. Using P2P technology to search for a popular song, for example, is likely to turn up
hundreds of other users who have the song available for download. See Schaumann, supra
note 25, at 1020-23.
43 Hollywood has made fewer missteps than record companies in addressing digital tech-
nology. This is no doubt due in part to the vastly larger size of digital video files relative to
music files, especially when the latter are compressed into the MP3 format. The immense
size of a digital movie continues to be unwieldy for most internet users. While that will very
likely change in the future, as compression technology and bandwidth improve, Hollywood
is already putting compelling legal alternatives in front of viewers. Digital video-on-demand,
for instance, permits a viewer to watch a movie, pause, fast-forward, and generally do all of
the things one can do with a rented videotape, for a 24-hour period. In the author's market,
the price is the same as renting a new release at Blockbuster, but one doesn't need to get up
and go anywhere, and there is no videotape to return. Picture and audio quality are exem-
plary. This kind of a legal alternative makes the illegal alternatives far less attractive, be-
cause they involve time, inconvenience, lower quality, and at least some potential risk.
44 See Amy Harmon, Grudingly, Music Labels Sell Their Songs Online, N.Y. TIMEs, July
1, 2002 at CI; Edna Gundersen, Any way you spin it, music industry in trouble, USA TODAY,
June 4, 2002, at Al; Nick Wingfield, Even You Can Download Music: Sites Add User
Friendly Features, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-print/
0,,SB1021409028751246560,00.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2003); Anna Wilde Matthews, Mar-
tin Peers & Nick Wingfield, Music Industry is Finally Online, But there Aren't Many Listen-
ers, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2002, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-print/
0,,SB102071833425i265480,00.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2003). Most recently, Apple Com-
puter's iTunes service appears to be succeeding where the content industry failed.
41 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting summary judgment motions of two defendants who supply P2P
technology; distinguishing the P2P technology at issue from the technology supplied by
Napster).
46 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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used to access copyrighted works.47 And in addition to waging battles
in Congress, the content industry has both threatened and filed lawsuits
to try to control technology and intimidate consumers-although the
industry has sometimes "won" when it has lost its lawsuits, and "lost"
when the lawsuits are won. There may be no better example than Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,48 in which Hollywood attempted
to control the sale of videocassette recorders. Even though Hollywood
lost the case, sales of movies on videotape generate more revenue for it
today than do box-office ticket sales.49
1. Digital Audiotape and the Audio Home Recording Act
Taking a page from Hollywood's book, in 1992 the music industry
threatened to sue the first person to import a consumer digital audi-
otape recorder. When Sony went ahead with its plans a lawsuit was
filed against it, reprising the events surrounding the videocassette re-
corder of ten years earlier.50 The resulting negotiations between con-
tent owners and the consumer electronics industry led to the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992 (the "AHRA").51 The AHRA, among
other things, required all consumer digital audiotape equipment to in-
clude built-in protection against digital serial copying-the practice of
making a digital copy of a digital copy.52 Serial copying, which takes
advantage of the generationless quality of digital recordings, is im-
mensely threatening to the content industry because it permits the viral
47 The DMCA prohibits the manufacture, importation, provision, or offering to public of
any "technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof" that is used to defeat
access-restriction schemes that lock up copyrighted works (for example, encryption). 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000). It is clear that the section prohibits software that can be used to
defeat access controls; in one of this section's first applications, a court found a violation
when a Norwegian teenager defeated the encryption for DVDs in order to play them on a
computer running the Linux operating system. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429, 437 (2d Cir. 2001). Recently, new and far more restrictive legislation has been
proposed. See discussion infra Part IV.
48 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
49 According to one commentator, "box office revenues make up less than a quarter of a
film's total take, with the largest amount coming from rental and sales of DVD's." Jeffrey R.
Armstrong, Sony, Napster, and Aimster: An Analysis of Dissimilar Applications of the Copy-
right Law to Similar Technologies, 13 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 13 (2003).
Even ten years ago, the home video market doubled box-office revenue. Nicholas E. Sci-
orra, Self-Help & Contributory Infringement: The Law and Legal Thought Behind a Little
"Black-Box," 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 905, 907 (1993).
51 Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990). See generally 2
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8B.01[C], at 8B-7 (2001).
51 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)).
52 17 U.S.C. § 1001(11) (2000) (definition of "serial copying"); id. § 1002(a) (requirement
of serial copy control).
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spread of copies. That is, every recipient of a copy can make a vast
number of additional copies, the recipients of which can make still
more copies, and so on. No doubt the content industry believed they
had successfully eliminated a dangerous technology by limiting the abil-
ity of consumers to copy serially. That compromise, however, came at
a price: the content industry agreed to a limitation on its ability to sue
consumers, agreeing that:
No action may be brought under [the Copyright Act] alleging in-
fringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or
distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio record-
ing medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording me-
dium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog mu-
sical recordings.53
Just what this language meant would soon be put to the test.
2. Diamond Multimedia and the MP3 Format
During the mid-1990's, the MP3 audio format 54 became popular
for the digital transfer of audio over the internet.55 As interest in MP3-
encoded music grew, a small California company called Diamond Mul-
timedia Systems Inc. looked for new markets created by MP3 music. 5 6
Diamond eventually began to manufacture and market a small portable
device called the "Rio. ' '57 The Rio, similar in size and functionality to a
Sony Walkman, played MP3 files rather than CDs or tapes. These mu-
sic files were usually downloaded from the internet and then trans-
ferred to the Rio using the included software. In 1999 the RIAA filed a
lawsuit against Diamond. 58 The RIAA claimed that the Rio was a
"digital audio recording device," and therefore the AHRA required the
Rio to include serial copy prevention technology.59 But in the 1992
compromise that produced the AHRA,60 the content industry agreed
to exempt computer hardware and peripheral devices from the Act's
requirements, including the requirement that serial copying be pre-
53 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (emphasis added).
54 MP3 files contain music converted to digital form and then compressed using an al-
gorithm that dramatically reduces the amount of bytes needed to represent the music. See
Recording Industry Ass'n v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir.
1999). Although some information is lost in compression (i.e., the compression is "lossy"),
MP3 files when played are entirely acceptable to the average consumer. Most of the music
files distributed via P2P networks are in the MP3 format.
55 Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1074.
56 Id.
17 Id at 1073.
58 Id at 1075.
59 Id. at 1075.
60 See Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078 n.6.
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vented.61 The Ninth Circuit thus had to decide whether the Rio was a
"digital audio recording device" within the AHRA, or whether the Rio
was so bound up with the use of a computer that it was exempt from
AHRA requirements. If it was subject to AHRA regulation, the Rio
would be required to incorporate serial copy prevention; if not, then no
copy prevention was mandated.
It seems to be a straightforward question: is the Rio a "digital au-
dio recording device" or isn't it? Copyright law had become so intri-
cate, however, that almost nothing was as simple as it seemed.
Applying the AHRA, the Ninth Circuit held that the Rio would be a
digital audio recording device only if it were capable of making a "digi-
tal audio copied recording," which was in turn defined as a digital re-
production of a "digital musical recording. '62 A great deal, then,
turned on whether MP3 files were "digital musical recordings." To a
layperson, the answer seems obvious: MP3 files are digital, they are
musical, and they are recordings. Legally, however, it turns out they
are no such thing: "Digital musical recording" is defined in the AHRA
as a material object with certain properties, namely, that it stores
sounds, and that the sounds can be reproduced from it.63 (The para-
digm digital musical recording is a CD.) Expressly carved out from the
definition of "digital musical recordings" are material objects "in which
one or more computer programs are fixed. ' 64 Computer hard disks,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned, cannot be "digital musical recordings," be-
cause they contain computer programs, as well as many other things
besides fixations of audio and incidental instructions. 65 Because the
61 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(3), (4)(B)(ii), (5)(B)(ii). One might wonder why the content indus-
try agreed to exempt technology that within a few years would become arguably the biggest
threat in history to the industry's business model. The answer is that in 1992, the vast major-
ity of personal computers lacked the storage and transmission capabilities necessary to make
them practical devices for copying and distributing musical content. See Schaumann, supra
note 25, at 1010. Evidently the industry did not anticipate the how quickly storage and
distribution technology would progress.
62 Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1075-76.
63 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1); see also Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1076.
64 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B); see also Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1076. Also excluded from the
definition are material objects that contain fixations of things other than sounds (except
instructions incidental to the sounds). 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A).
65 Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1076. Because a device is a "digital audio recording device" only
if it can make "digital audio copied recordings," which are in turn digital reproductions of
"digital musical recordings," the determination that MP3 files are not digital musical record-
ings would suffice to decide this part of the case. However, for good measure, the Ninth
Circuit went on to decide that computers and their hard disks are not "digital audio record-
ing devices" because their primary purpose is not to make digital audio copied recordings.
Id. at 1078. The court also addressed the RIAA's contention that the Rio could indirectly
reproduce a transmission of a digital musical recording. The Ninth Circuit held that digital
audio recording devices must be able to do at least one of two things: either directly
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Rio can only receive MP3 files that are transferred from a computer
hard disk-which are not "digital musical recordings"-the Rio is not a
"digital audio recording device."'66
The Diamond Multimedia case (and the AHRA, which it inter-
preted) furnishes a good example of copyright law's reliance on as-
sumptions about the congruence of content and container. The case
turned on whether an MP3 file was a "digital musical recording"; from
the perspective of content, it would seem the answer must be "yes."
What else would one call something that is digital, musical, and re-
corded? But the statute defines digital musical recordings by reference
to containers, and a container that includes computer programs along
with music cannot be a digital musical recording. 67 Once technology
made a content-specific container unnecessary, the statute became ob-
solete.68 Containers aren't synonymous with content anymore.
The Sony and Diamond Multimedia cases are chapters in the story
of the content industry's efforts to control threatening technology.
Like Sony, Diamond Multimedia is an example of the industry's litiga-
tion losses becoming business wins. Although in Diamond, the RIAA
tried and failed to control MP3 technology, the reason for that failure-
that computer fixations in the MP3 format are not "digital musical re-
cordings"-would just a few years later become part of the foundation
of the content industry's attack on P2P technology.
3. MAI and the Nature of a Digital "Copy"
While Diamond was contemplating the possibilities of the MP3
format, the Ninth Circuit decided what might be the single most impor-
tant copyright case of the digital era to date. That case is MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. ,69 the aftershocks of which are still rever-
berating. MAI involved a manufacturer of mainframe hardware and
software (MAI), and an upstart company (Peak) that attempted to take
away some of MAI's business by servicing MAI's computers.70 When
reproduce digital musical recordings, or directly reproduce transmissions of digital musical
recordings (thereby indirectly reproducing the underlying digital musical recordings). Id. at
1076. The Rio could do neither. Id. at 1079-81.
66 Id. at 1081.
67 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A) (2000).
68 The consumer digital audio tape format from which the statute was supposed to protect
the content industry never caught on. Today, the only digital consumer format about which
the industry cares-MP3-is unaddressed by the AHRA. From the industry's perspective,
however, that may not be a bad thing. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
69 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
70 Id. at 513.
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MAI's customer service manager and three other employees joined
Peak, MAI sued. 71
Lawsuits by former employers of key employees against the lat-
ter's new employers are, of course, routine. But among the causes of
action MAI asserted was, strangely enough, copyright infringement 72-
based not on the copying of MAI manuals, etc. (which might be ex-
pected), but rather on the operation of MAI computers. 73 The Ninth
Circuit held this to be infringement. Specifically, the court held, when a
computer runs, it necessarily loads operating system software into its
random access memory ("RAM") from its "permanent" storage device
(which could be tape, floppy disk, hard disk, or anything else non-vola-
tile; i.e., that does not require uninterrupted electrical power to store
information). RAM, by contrast, is volatile, as anyone knows who has
suffered a power interruption while working on a computer. The issue
therefore was whether the copying of operating system software that
takes place inside a computer, when it is turned on, is "copying" that
infringes the software's copyright. 74
Many people confronted with this proposition would find it aston-
ishing. After all, the software on a hard (or floppy) disk cannot be used
without this kind of copying. Surely the law cannot require a separate
or additional license to use software, once one is in possession of a li-
censed copy? But that is exactly what the Ninth Circuit held. The
court held that the copy made in a computer's RAM is a "copy" under
the Copyright Act, 75 and therefore that operating an MAI computer
was copyright infringement when the operator did not have a license
from MAI to do so. In this way, the Ninth Circuit created what
amounts to a new exclusive right under the Copyright Act: the exclu-
sive right to use software. 76 Many have criticized this "RAM copy doc-
trine," often on persuasive grounds. 77 Regardless, it has fundamentally
71 Id.
72 "The complaint includes counts alleging copyright infringement, misappropriation of
trade secrets, trademark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition." Id.
71 Id. at 514. Also claimed as infringement were Peak's unlicensed use of MAI software
at its headquarters and its loaning of MAI hardware and software to Peak customers without
authorization. Id. at 517.
74 Id. at 517-18.
71 Id. at 519.
76 See generally Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & Er
L.J. 29 (1994). Chapter Four of Digital Copyright is based in part on this article, which I
highly recommend for those interested in the "RAM copy doctrine."
77 The first case finding a defendant liable for making a RAM copy was a district court
case in Illinois, which was almost entirely devoid of reasoning. See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp.
v. Altech, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1310, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Thereafter, the idea of RAM "cop-
ies" remained obscure until 1993, when it returned in the MAI case. Like Altech, however,
MAI did little more than conclude that copies in RAM were fixed and therefore legally
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changed the law of digital copyright. For it is not just software that is
loaded into a computer's RAM: all content accessed digitally is trans-
ferred to RAM before it is made perceptible to humans.78 Thus, all
content in digital format must be licensed not only for reproduction and
distribution, but also for use.79
4. Legislative Erosion in the Late 1990s
In 1997, and again in 1998, copyright was strengthened, and in each
case the public's rights respecting copyrighted works were diminished.
First, in 1997, Congress passed the Copyright Term Extension Act,80
extending the term of copyright by 20 years. Today, if the author is a
natural person, copyright lasts for the author's life plus seventy years.81
If the author is a corporation, or in the case of works works for hire and
works for which the author's identity is unknown, copyright lasts for
the shorter of 95 years from publication, or 120 years from creation.82
These periods are so long that, from an economic perspective, they may
as well be forever.8 3 In 1998, as we have already noted,8 4 Congress
passed the DMCA, giving copyright owners a new cause of action: Cir-
cumventing technological measures designed to control access to a
"copies" for copyright purposes. On fixation, the court said only that by showing that Peak
loads the software into the RAM and is then able to view the system error log and diagnose
the problem with the computer, MAI has adequately shown that the representation created
in the RAM is 'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. MAI, 991 F.2d at
518 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). After MAI, the doctrine was uncritically accepted in a series
of lower court cases, none of which engaged in any critical examination of the rule or what it
might mean. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22
U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 550-52 nn.20 & 26 (1997) (discussing case law that suggests RAM
copies are fixed, and unfixed).
78 This process is invisible to the computer's user; the engineering reason for it is that
permanent storage is relatively slow compared to RAM. Manipulating data, reading, listen-
ing, and so on would become intolerably slow if they were mediated by hard disk accesses.
79 Actually, there is one exception to this rule, but it seldom, if ever, applies anymore.
Section 117 of the Copyright Act gives the "owner of a copy of a computer program" the
right to copy the program, if doing so is "an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program." 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2000). This section has no practical value, however, be-
cause no computer program (or any other digital content for computer use) is "sold."
Rather, it is "licensed," with significant reservations of rights in the content owner. Section
117 does not apply to licensing transactions. See, e.g., MAI, 991 F.2d at 518 n.5.
80 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1997) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
8 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
82 Id. § 302(c).
83 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 267, 123 S. Ct. 769, 808 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(the current copyright period of protection, "even under conservative assumptions, is worth
more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity").
I See supra notes 39, 46-47 and accompanying text.
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copyrighted work is illegal, even when the access is for a non-infringing
purpose. 85
5. The Assault on P2P Technology
By the late 1990s, the storage capacity of the average home com-
puter had increased by a factor of 4,000 over what it was in 1992, the
year the AHRA was enacted.8 6 While in 1992 the idea of consumers
storing large amounts of digital music on their hard disks was far-
fetched, just a few years later it was a reality. In addition, with the
rapid multiplication of connections to the internet, the ability of con-
sumers to distribute content grew manyfold. As long as illicit content
distribution took place from central nodes on the internet, for example
from web sites, the content industry had at least some capacity to con-
trol the threat. P2P technology, however, decentralized distribution, by
enabling individual users to distribute content to other individual users.
Napster, the first widely popular P2P network, took advantage of the
vastly increased storage capabilities of personal computers and the fact
that many of those new computers were connected to the internet by
offering users a means to connect to each other and distribute con-
tent-specifically, music in the MP3 format-via Napster's P2P
network.87
Napster's popularity exploded. News stories placed the number of
Napster users at 60-100 million.88 The content business was clearly fac-
ing the next great challenge to its business model, and record compa-
nies and others filed a lawsuit against Napster. 89 The claim was not that
Napster was itself infringing any copyrights; rather, the industry argued,
Napster was contributing to infringement by its users. 90 The courts
agreed. 91 But what of the AHRA provision 92 that no infringement ac-
tion can be brought based on "noncommercial use by a consumer of...
85 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
86 See Schaumann, supra note 25, at 1017-18.
87 See Steven Levy, The Noisy War Over Napster, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2000, at 46; Karl
Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 59.
88 See sources cited supra note 87.
89 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
90 The industry also claimed that Napster was vicariously liable for its users' infringement.
The court agreed, Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023-24, a controversial decision because vicarious
liability generally requires a financial benefit to the defendant. It is most commonly applied
"against a defendant whose economic interests [are] intertwined with the direct infringer's
.... .Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (vicarious
liability may be imposed on the operator of a swap meet at which vendors, renting space
from the operator, were selling infringing materials).
91 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-23.
92 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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a [digital or analog recording] device or medium for making digital mu-
sical recordings or analog musical recordings?" 93 Would this provision
protect Napster users from infringement liability? It was an important
question, because if consumers were protected by the AHRA, Napster
might not have been secondarily liable.94 Consumers, however, were
not protected by section 1008. The reason can be found in Diamond
Multimedia, which held that MP3 files stored on a computer hard disk
are not "digital musical recordings. ' 95 Therefore, consumer download-
ing of MP3 files-which under Diamond does not involve making "dig-
ital musical recordings"-is not exempted by section 1008, which
permits the making of digital musical recordings. Thus, Diamond Mul-
timedia, a defeat for the content industry when it was decided, became
the reason that home copying of MP3 files can be infringement, not-
withstanding that the language of the AHRA at the time it was drafted
was intended comprehensively to insulate from liability all noncommer-
cial home copying of music files.96 Again, content owners won by los-
ing their lawsuit.
III. SOUNDING THE ALARM
Notwithstanding the content industry's aggressive pursuit of ex-
panded copyright protection at the expense of consumers, the latter
have remained passive. Sounding the alarm, however, are the books of
Professors Litman and Vaidhyanathan. Both are aimed at non-lawyers,
and that is in itself noteworthy. Most books on copyright for non-law-
yers fall into either the "here's how to protect your work" category,
aimed at authors taking a do-it-yourself approach to copyright, or the
"copyright for librarians and educators" category. Few books aimed at
general audiences have addressed copyright policy, and fewer still-
maybe none-are as insightful as these. Jessica Litman's book, Digital
Copyright, provides a thought-provoking tour of the history that has
shaped our copyright present, and a accurate description of where we
" 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
14 Because the court held that Napster's users were infringing, this question was not
reached. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. Had the court held that Napster users do not in-
fringe, it would have left open the question whether § 1008, which says that "[n]o action may
be brought under [the Copyright Act] alleging infringement of copyright based on [ex-
empted conduct]," also prohibits actions for contributory infringement when the primary
conduct is exempted. Contributory infringement actions might not be prohibited, because
section 1008 does not say that the exempted conduct isn't infringing; it merely says that it
cannot be the basis for (direct) suit. The argument to the contrary is that under these cir-
cumstances, an action for contributory infringement is "based on" exempted conduct.
Therefore it is barred. It remains unclear which interpretation is correct.
95 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024-25. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
96 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, § 8B.07.
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now stand. Litman, a professor at Wayne State University School of
Law, writes in a clear, cogent style that makes her book a pleasure to
read. Her focus is on copyright policy, rather than the arcane details of
copyright law. Enough details are included, however, to lend credibil-
ity to her central idea: If copyright law is to be applied to consumers,
then consumers ought to have a seat at the table where the copyright
bargain is struck.
Siva Vaidhyanathan takes a different approach in Copyrights and
Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens
Creativity. He focuses on authors rather than consumers, pointing out
that the creators of copyrighted works suffer when copyright is ex-
panded too far. Not a lawyer, he courageously wades into this arcane
legal subject with an acute perception of what is at stake. He is most
interested in the cultural consequences of today's copyright policies,
and so his book is complementary to rather than repetitive of Litman's.
While Litman shows us that present-day American copyright law is spe-
cial-interest politics on steroids, Vaidhyanathan traces the development
of popular American culture and how it was and continues to be influ-
enced by copyright. Both authors make the case that United States
copyright law has gone dramatically awry and both conclude that the
fault lies in part with a Congress in thrall to the content industry, un-
willing to master the challenges posed by the combination of digital
technology and copyright.
A. Digital Copyright
Digital Copyright is closely reasoned and solidly grounded in the
history of American copyright law. Professor Litman is a master not
only of copyright law, but also of legal argument and advocacy, and the
result is a book both accessible and compelling. Unlike most legal aca-
demics, Professor Litman uses everyday language and lucid exposition.
This is a book anyone can read, and a book every student of copyright,
every copyright lawyer, and perhaps every lawyer, should read.
Professor Litman focuses on the history of American copyright
since 1900. Early on she identifies copyright lawmaking as a unique
process in which the affected industries negotiate among themselves
and agree upon what the law should be, and Congress enacts it.97 This,
I The sole exception, according to Professor Litman, was the enactment of section 117 of
the Copyright Act in 1980. This section was enacted upon the recommendation of the Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU"). CONTU was at
least "a learned commission charged with divining a solution to the problems posed by com-
puters and photocopy machines." Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technologi-
cal Change, 68 Or. L. Rev. 275, 279 n.11 (1989). Section 117 permits copying of computer
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of course, might be said to describe the federal legislative process in
general, but copyright is different in the degree to which the law is
purely the result of inter-industry agreement. Public debate over the
contents of copyright legislation is unheard of. The predictable result is
that the negotiators-in other words, the content industry, along with
broadcasters and other industries that use copyrighted works-allocate
all rights to use copyrighted works among themselves. Although the
public uses copyrighted works every day, almost nothing in the Copy-
right Act confers such rights. But to understand the present, we must
understand the past, and Professor Litman provides historical context
and explanation through her study of the recent history of copyright.
1. The Beginnings of Industry-Controlled Copyright
In Professor Litman's account, the process of copyright legislation
by industry negotiation began at the turn of the last century, when the
nation's first Register of Copyrights, Thorvald Solberg, repeatedly
asked Congress for a copyright revision bill to simplify and prune the
copyright law. Congress paid no attention; the Senate Patent Commit-
tee could not even muster a quorum to consider the subject. Solberg,
who believed that a revision of copyright was essential, asked the Pat-
ent Committee to appoint a special commission to consider copyright
revision, but the Patent Committee was hostile to the idea. Herbert
Putnam, the Librarian of Congress, then suggested that Congress could
by resolution authorize the Library of Congress to convene a commis-
sion of experts to consider copyright revision. That proposal also
failed, because the Committee was uncertain that Senate authorization
was appropriate. But the Committee suggested that it would be happy
if the Library of Congress simply appointed a commission on its own.98
The Library gratefully accepted the Patent Committee's invitation,
and representatives of the copyright industries were invited to negoti-
ate an acceptable revision among themselves. Uninvited, however,
were industries that did not yet have any rights under the copyright
programs in certain cases. See supra note 79. It is interesting to note that the only respect in
which Congress deviated from CONTU's recommendation was that as adopted, section 117
gave the right to copy only to the owner of a copy. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000). CONTU
recommended that the right be given to the rightful possessor of a copy. Final Report of the
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 12 (1978), available at http://
digital-law-online.info/CONTU/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2003). But for this change, the mis-
chief wrought by the RAM copy doctrine would largely have been avoided, as RAM copies
are almost always made by persons lawfully in possession of (licensed) copies. They are
rarely if ever made by "owners," because digital content is inevitably licensed and not sold.
See supra note 79.
98 DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 38-39.
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statute, including the emerging piano roll and "talking machine" (pho-
nograph) industries. 99 The invited industries produced a bill, but when
it reached Congress, testimony from the uninvited industries was scath-
ing, in some cases going "so far as to suggest that Congress was being
hoodwinked by a monopolistic conspiracy.' 1 00
Revisions to the bill failed to produce agreement, and the follow-
ing year each camp submitted its own preferred bill. At the joint hear-
ings on these bills, the testimony was as contentious as before, but at
the conclusion of the hearings, a representative of the songwriters sug-
gested that his group might sit down with counterparts from the piano
roll and talking machine industries to work out a compromise. Con-
gress gave its assurance (through Rep. Currier, chairman of the House
Patent Committee) that if the industries present through their witnesses
reached agreement on a bill, Congress would pass it.101 This process
resulted in the Copyright Act of 1909, and provided the template for all
subsequent revisions and amendments of American copyright law. Al-
though the piano roll and talking machine industries participated, the
emerging radio and motion picture industries were missing from the
1909 compromise. This soon became a problem, as it did not take long
for motion pictures and radio to become significant players in the mar-
ket for exploitation of copyrighted works. The 1909 Act had to be
amended several times in the next couple of decades to take account of
the interests of these industries.
2. The Copyright Act of 1976
By the 1950s, it was clear that the 1909 Act was obsolete, and work
began on a successor that was ultimately enacted as the Copyright Act
of 1976. The new Act was created by a process of inter-industry negoti-
ation similar to that which created its predecessor.10 2 The new statute,
however, suffered through a much longer period of negotiation, partly
due to the proliferation of new technologies, including cable television.
Nevertheless, many interests went unrepresented because they didn't
99 Id. at 39.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 40.
102 Professor Litman notes that an opportunity was missed at the time discussions for
revision of the 1909 Act began. In 1956, the Register of Copyrights, Arthur Fisher, envi-
sioned a process in which a committee of experts (mainly lawyers from the American Bar
Association Section of Intellectual Property Law) acted in an advisory capacity only, while
policy decisions were made in the Copyright Office. This process was predictably disfavored
by the experts, who insisted on being given a voice in policy. Shortly before the completion
of Register Fisher's Report to Congress on copyright revision, Fisher died. His successor,
Abraham Kaminstein, returned the process to the form it had taken in the preceding half-
century, as outlined above. Id. at 49-51.
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yet exist, including "videocassette manufacturers, direct satellite broad-
casters, digital audio technicians, personal computer users, motion pic-
ture colorizers, online database subscribers, [and] Internet service
providers.' 0 3 Notably, the public was uninvited and unrepresented,
and when the public interest was asserted, it went unheeded. In this
respect the new Act was not different from the old.
Professor Litman's central criticism of copyright is that the absence
at the copyright bargaining table of the public and emerging copyright
industries cannot result in satisfactory legislation. Inter-industry nego-
tiations inevitably shortchange those not present. They shortchange
the public because the resulting legislation speaks explicitly only to
commercial uses, and almost never to public uses. They shortchange
industries businesses not yet in existence because legislation adopted by
inter-industry agreement more closely resembles a highly detailed con-
tract than it does an expression of policy, and the contract allocates all
rights to those present when it was negotiated. The 1976 Act states
ownership rights in the broadest possible terms, while exceptions per-
mitting use are as narrowly drawn as possible. 10 4 This style of drafting
results in the participants laying claim to all the territory, with little risk
of interference from latecomers, who are unlikely to fit within one of
the exceptions (which, after all, were narrowly tailored to the requests
of a participant in the negotiations). It seems to be working: By one
means or another, every new use has been allocated back to the holder
of an existing right.10 5 Notably, the right of the public to use copy-
righted works, something that happens every day, is not described and
rarely even mentioned in the Act.10 6
3. Does it Matter? The Impact of Copyright on Consumers
Today
This, of course, is the way it has been for nearly 100 years. Is there
reason to be concerned now, when perhaps there wasn't for a rather
long time? There is indeed reason to be concerned, because for the
first time, consumer uses are being targeted by copyright owners. In
103 Id. at 51.
104 Id. at 54-57.
105 For example, merely viewing a work on a computer monitor involves making a "copy"
of the work and requires permission from the copyright holder, even when the viewer has
no ability to store the work or to reload it for later viewing. If the user does reload it, say by
visiting a web site a second time, then two "copies" have been made. MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Associ-
ates, Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999).
106 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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the past, consumers were unrepresented in the process of making copy-
right law, but it didn't matter much because, after all, no one was
threatening to cut off consumer uses or sue consumers. Copyright liti-
gation took place between industry players; although technically con-
sumers could infringe, copyright owners typically were not very
concerned about it. Inability to manufacture large quantities of tangi-
ble copies made large-scale infringement by consumers unlikely.
Small-scale copying, too, was rarely pursued: The difficulty of detecting
small-scale copying, combined with the expense of pursuing litigation
and the uncertainty of the outcome, deterred copyright owners from
suing consumers.'0 7
But we have already seen how the internet changed all that. Once
content is liberated from its containers, copying becomes trivially easy,
and distribution not much more difficult. As a result, we see content
owners threatening to file lawsuits against consumers en masse. "Par-
ents, roommates-even grandparents-are being targeted in the music
industry's new campaign to track computer users who share songs over
the Internet, bringing the threat of expensive lawsuits to more than col-
lege kids."' 08 The Associated Press reports that the RIAA has issued
at least 911 subpoenas seeking information on possible P2P infringers
so far. 10 9 As of this writing, 261 lawsuits have been filed, with the
promise of "thousands" more to come." 0 The Copyright Act provides
for statutory damages of $200 to $150,000 for each work infringed,"'
107 It is worth noting that the absence of consumer rights in the Act has left some impor-
tant areas of copyright policy unclear. For example, what are we to make of the relative lack
of litigation involving small-scale copying by consumers? Should we consider it infringement
that is rarely sued upon because it is hard to detect, or is it perhaps not infringement at all?
Currently, the answer under the Act is almost certainly that it is infringement, if only be-
cause the Act is almost entirely silent on the rights of the public regarding copyrighted
works. The question matters, because digital technology doesn't only make it easy to copy
and distribute-it also makes it easier to detect and limit copying and distribution. Thus, the
DMCA endorses access-prevention and copy-prevention technologies. See supra note 47.
108 Ted Bridis, Music-Sharing Subpoenas Target Parents, NEws ON RED NOVA, July 24,
2003, at www.rednova.com/news/stories/3/2003/07/24/storyOO3.html) (last visited July 25,
2003).
109 Id.
110 Steve Lohr, Fighting the Idea that All the Internet is Free, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2003, at
Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O3/09/09/technology/09FREE.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2003).
111 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000). A great deal of popular music can now be purchased at
Apple Computer's online iThnes Music Store for $1 per track, and so a demand for immense
statutory damages might be nullified by a jury. See Zahlaway, supra note 39. Nevertheless,
even the costs of a defense are enough to cause serious financial hardship to most prospec-
tive defendants in the threatened RIAA cases.
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making litigation potentially a very costly proposition for defendants in
RIAA cases." 2
Another danger arises from the fact that so much information is
now accessed mainly in digital form. As Litman points out, the result is
that copyright has de facto become the United States' information pol-
icy. 113 It is, of course, axiomatic that copyright neither protects nor re-
stricts ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation,
concepts, principles or discoveries. 114 Is it possible, then, that much or
most readily-accessible information could become the content indus-
try's property? To a surprising degree, the answer is yes. Because con-
tent is now containerless, the content industry is seeking laws that are
no longer tied to containers. The danger is that restricting the copying
and distribution of containerless content is restricting the copying and
distribution of information. Content, separated from its container, is
simply information. Of course, not all information is protected by cop-
yright.115 But non-copyrightable information is often-perhaps most
often-intermingled with copyrightable expression. For example, an
encyclopedia is packed with non-copyrightable information, but the in-
formation is bound up with the authors' copyrightable expression. If
the owner of copyright in the encyclopedia can limit how and when the
encyclopedia is used (meaning how and when the information is ac-
cessed), then the information itself is effectively locked up, along with
the expression that conveys it. In 1998, Congress passed the DMCA,
which as we have seen 16 prohibits circumventing access restrictions
that protect copyrighted work. Circumvention is a violation, even if the
purpose of accessing the work is legal (for example, to make fair use of
it, or to extract non-copyrightable information). So, if the encyclopedia
is protected by access restrictions, the information it contains is availa-
ble only upon meeting the content owner's conditions, and paying the
price. In effect, the information has become the "property" of the cop-
112 The music industry's threats have also attracted Congress' attention. Sen. Coleman
(R-Minn.) has registered concern about consumers' privacy rights, and about whether the
penalties for downloading music fit the offense. See Amy Harmon, Efforts to Stop Music
Swapping Draw More Fire, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2003, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/08/01/business/01MUSI.html?tntemaill (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
113 This is a crucial point; unfortunately, Professor Litman never really follows up on it. It
is mentioned in passing in nearly every chapter, but never addressed in more depth.
114 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
115 The idea of "copyrightable expression" has in the last twenty years ballooned almost
beyond recognition, partly as the result of the protection of software by copyright. Software
is almost entirely functional; finding "expression" in it distorts the meaning of expression
beyond what anyone would have imagined before 1980. See supra notes 4-7 and accompany-
ing text.
116 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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yright owner. Other sources may exist for the information, but over
time these could diminish as more and more copyrightable material be-
comes protected by DMCA-backed restrictions on access.
The trend toward ownership of information is helped along by the
metaphors content owners choose for the rights they assert. Professor
Litman notes that copyrights are now more often than not referred to
as "property," and analogies are frequently drawn between a copyright
interest and an interest in a tangible piece of personal property,11 7 or
even real property. 8 But, she points out, it was not always so. At the
turn of the last century, the 1909 Act "granted authors limited exclusive
rights (and only if the authors fulfilled a variety of formal conditions) in
return for the immediate public dissemination of the work and the
eventual dedication of the work to the public domain."' 119 Neither au-
thors and publishers, nor the public, were entitled to all the economic
benefits generated by a new work. "Rather, they shared the proceeds,
each entitled to claim that portion of them that would best encourage
the promiscuous creation of still newer works of authorship."'' 2 0 Un-
happy with this arrangement, she says, content owners began to shift
the rhetoric away from "limited rights" and bargains between the au-
thor and the public, toward "property.' 12 1 Property is owned by some-
one; with property, there is a presumption that the owner's rights are
supreme and whatever the owner prohibits is legally impermissible.
117 A nice example of this appeared in the New York Times recently. In a letter to the
editor, Marilyn Bergman, the president of the American Society of Authors, Composers and
Publishers ("ASCAP"), said that "[t]he notion that some musicians are at fault because they
want to prevent people from casually listening to their music without payment is akin to
saying that drivers are at fault for locking their cars because they want to prevent strangers
from casually taking them out for joyrides." Marilyn Bergman, Artists Deserve Support,
N.Y. TiiEs, July 19, 2003, at A12 (letter to the editor). Ms. Bergman's letter, of course, begs
the question whether copyright should be treated like personal property.
118 During the debate over the DMCA, for example, the content industry argued that
"breaking into technological protection ... was like breaking into a home or stealing a
book." DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 132. But this is merely bootstrapping. Why
is it like breaking into a home? In the absence of pre-existing property rights in the pro-
tected content-including a right of exclusive use and possession-the analogy fails. And
until the DMCA, copyright had never provided such a right in published works. Part of the
historical copyright bargain was that copyright owners provided full, unfettered access to
published works. Since there was no right to exclude others from use and possession, the
argument in support of access restrictions is specious.
"9 Id. at 78.
l20 Id. at 79.
121 Id. Even some of those concerned about content industry excesses have succumbed to
the property talk.
'If you're taking someone else's property, that's wrong, that's stealing,' Senator Coleman,
Republican of Minnesota and chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations, said . . . . 'But in this country we don't cut off people's hands when they
steal. One question I have is whether the penalty here fits the crime.'
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And along with "property talk," Litman notes, today the industry (and
the media) are using a lot of "piracy talk." At one time, "piracy" meant
making and distributing large quantities of counterfeit copies; the term
was generally reserved to commercial enterprises engaged in criminal
activities. Today, any copying to which the content industry has not
consented, it calls "piracy." It even refers to legal copying as piracy (for
example, taping a CD borrowed from a friend). 122 By shifting the rhet-
oric, the industry is trying to change people's ideas about content and
the use of content.
So far, the content industry's attempt to persuade the public that
no use is allowed without the copyright owner's permission has not
been very successful. Amazingly large numbers of consumers seem to
be paying no attention whatsoever to the copyright rules that purport-
edly apply to them.123 Indeed, Professor Litman points out, most con-
sumers have no idea what copyright law provides, and wouldn't believe
it if they were told. 124 Realizing this, the content industry throughout
the 1990's has sought to enhance the penalties for infringement and
simultaneously to broaden its scope by defining more activities as copy-
right violations. They succeeded on both counts. Criminal copyright
infringement, formerly reserved for commercial, for-profit activity,
since 1997 includes even non-commercial infringements, provided the
dollar value of infringed material exceeds $1000.125 The following year,
Congress passed the DMCA, with its prohibition on circumventing any
technological measure applied by a copyright owner to protect a
work.126 A year after that, statutory damages for infringement were
increased by 50 percent.12 7
Amy Harmon, Efforts to Stop Music Swapping Draw More Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at
C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/O1/business/O1MUSI.html?tntemaill (last
visited Aug. 1, 2003).
122 DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 85 (citing a statement to Congress by Hilary
Rosen, then-president of the RIAA).
123 Consider the statistics on use of P2P services. Tens of millions of Americans have
used, and many continue to use, these illicit sources of entertainment. See supra notes 42-43
and accompanying text.
124 DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 112.
125 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000). This paragraph was added in 1997 by the No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). That Act also directed the
United States Sentencing Commission to "ensure that the applicable guideline range for a
defendant convicted of a crime against intellectual property ... is sufficiently stringent to
deter such a crime" and to "ensure that the guidelines provide for consideration of the retail
value and quantity of the items with respect to which the crime against intellectual property
was committed." 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
126 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
127 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000). This section was amended by the Digital Theft Deterrence
and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 133 Stat. 1774,
which raised the minimum and maximum amounts of statutory damages per work infringed
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In chapters titled, respectively, "The Bargaining Table" and "The
Copyright Wars," Professor Litman describes the enactment of the
DMCA and the efforts by the content industry to control the digital
distribution of content. Although the industry won a battle when the
DMCA was enacted, nothing so far has slowed the tide of digital distri-
bution. 128 Professor Litman attributes this to the public's lack of un-
derstanding of copyright law,129 and to the law's apparent embodiment
of values that the public doesn't share:130
[T]he only people who appear to believe that the current copyright
rules apply as written to every person on the planet are members of
the copyright bar. Representatives of current stakeholders, talking
among themselves, have persuaded one another that it must be true,
but that's a far cry from persuading the [general public]. 131
In her penultimate chapter, Professor Litman offers an admittedly
radical proposal for the reform of copyright in the information age: Jet-
tison copying as the fundamental right of the copyright owner, and sub-
stitute commercial exploitation. 132 Although she recognizes that this
by 50 percent. The new minimum is $750, and the new maximum is $30,000, and up to
$150,000 per work for "willful" infringement. Id.
128 See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Music File Sharers Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/19/technology/19TUNE.html
(last visited Sept. 19, 2003). After dipping in June, when the RIAA announced it would sue
consumers on P2P networks, traffic on the networks has remained steady, even after the
lawsuits were filed. See Amy Harmon, 261 Lawsuits Filed on Internet Music Swapping, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al. available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/09/technology/
09MUSI.html (last visited September 11, 2003) ("Traffic on file-sharing services dropped
after the recording industry announced its plans to sue file sharers in June."); Reuters, Music
Firms, DJ Offer to Pay 12-Year-Old's Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/reuters/technology/tech-media-music-lawsuit.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2003) ("Traffic has remained steady on peer-to-peer networks since the lawsuits were filed");
Reuters, Activity on Song-Swapping Networks Steady, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/arts/entertainment-media-riaa.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2003) (number of users in the first 10 days of September up 20% from the August average).
129 Indeed, Professor Litman argues that copyright's complexity has made it impossible
for the public to understand. DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 113.
130 Id. at 112-17. There is a great deal of support for this view. "[T]o many Americans,
file sharing seems ... like taping a song off the radio." Amy Harmon & John Schwartz,
Music File Sharers Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/09/19/technology/19TUNE.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003). No in-
fringement lawsuit could be brought against a consumer for taping a song off the radio. 17
U.S.C. § 1008 (2000). See Katie Hafner, Is It Wrong to Share Your Music? (Discuss), N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/technology/circuits/
18kids.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003). But see Reuters, Record Group Says Poll Shows
Support for Hard Line, FINDLAW.COM, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://news.findlaw.com/
entertainment/s/20030911/mediariaadc.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2003) (52% of Americans
surveyed "supported the music industry's position").
131 DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 115.
132 Professor Litman's proposal would also include as infringement uses, even consumer
uses, that adversely affects commercial exploitation. In this way, Napster would still be en-
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proposal is unlikely to become law any time soon,133 it is fascinating to
consider how it would change the copyright world. Colyright lawyers
have become so acclimated to the bizarre intricacies of their specialty
that certain things, like the inability to explain the law in a way that
makes sense to a non-specialist, are taken for granted. 34 The immense
simplification of copyright that would result from adopting her propo-
sal might be worth some temporary uncertainty. It would be refreshing
not to have to explain why it is legal to borrow a neighbor's CD and
copy it,135 but illegal to download the same content from the same
neighbor via a P2P connection. 136 The proposal has a lot to commend
it, not least that it makes sense to non-copyright specialists, 137 and al-
lows the content industry to keep most of what it has had for the last
100 years. It would not be supported by the content industry, however,
joined from operating its P2P network, as the widespread distribution of MP3 files adversely
affect the record companies' commercial exploitation of their sound recordings. DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 180-81.
133 Id. at 189 n.29. This is the only place where Professor Litman acknowledges that such
a proposal would violate the obligations of the United States under international treaties
(for example, the Berne Convention).
131 Professor Litman effectively described this phenomenon: "There is something funda-
mental about coming to understand that current law may make it technically illegal to watch
a movie and then imagine what it would have looked like if the studio had cast some other
actor in the leading role, that renders one unfit for ordinary reflective thinking," Id. at 22
(footnote omitted). The example she provides is based on the exclusive right of the copy-
right owner to prepare derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). While a derivative work, like
any other work, must be "fixed" before it can be protected, see supra note 31, the definition
of "derivative work"on its face does not require fixation, see 17 U.S.C. § 101. Thus it is
possible that an unprotectable (because unfixed) but nevertheless infringing derivative work
could exist in someone's mind. Enforcement in this case would be difficult, to say the least.
135 See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
136 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
137 See Katie Hafner, Is It Wrong to Share Your Music? (Discuss), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/technology/circuits/18kids.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2003) (Statement by a 13-year-old girl who downloads music: "If it's some-
thing for personal use, as long as you're not redistributing it, it should be O.K."). This state-
ment shows a remarkable degree of insight into the law; it tracks closely the provisions of the
AHRA, see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text, and distinguishes between copying
and distributing, something even the Ninth Circuit failed to do in Napster. The Napster
court's discussion of the infringement by Napster's users takes up merely three sentences:
We agree that plaintiffs have shown that Napster users infringe at least two of the copy-
right holders' exclusive rights: the rights of reproduction, § 106(1); and distribution,
§ 106(3). Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy
violate plaintiffs' distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing copy-
righted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction rights.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. Of course, uploading file names cannot infringe record company
copyrights; titles are generally lack the originality needed for copyright protection, and file
names in any case generally consist of more than the title of the song. See Schaumann, supra
note 25, at 1028-29 & notes 108-09.
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because the industry has little to gain and much to lose from any revi-
sion of the law.138
The final chapter of Professor Litman's book is a rather gloomy
coda, but one that in hindsight appears extraordinarily prescient. She
offers little hope for the legislative process as a means of reintroducing
the public into the matrix of copyright interests. Instead, she says, "in
order to actually enforce the rights that content owners claim the stat-
ute gives them, it will be necessary to enforce [the statute] against indi-
vidual consumers."'1 39 And that is exactly what is happening today.
Whether the industry can survive its own tactics remains to be seen;
already, it appears that the RIAA's anti-consumer lawsuits are result-
ing in more civil disobedience than compliance. 140 These lawsuits, per-
haps more than any other development in the last 50 years, might get
the public involved in copyright again. For nearly 100 years, copyright
policy was made in backroom deals by representatives from content
industries. The public's elected representatives in Congress have, for
the most part, abdicated their responsibility and simply enacted
whatever industry compromise they were presented with. Slash-and-
burn litigation, aimed squarely at the public, may prove to be the cata-
lyst for a new model of copyright. Litman explains that copyright law is
as it is because the public doesn't know or care what the law says. But
getting sued can be a wonderful catalyst for public concern. It may be
that the P2P lawsuits are the seeds of real copyright change.
B. Copyrights and Copywrongs
The second book sounding the copyright alarm, Siva Vaidhy-
anathan's Copyrights and Copywrongs, is different in many respects
from Litman's book. Professor Vaidhyanathan is a master of the anec-
dote. He has a talent for bringing legal policy to life using stories about
popular personages, including Mark Twain, Willie Dixon, Muddy Wa-
ters, the Marx Brothers, Led Zeppelin, and many others. The result is
a breezy book that occasionally lacks intellectual rigor but is always
138 For example, such a change in copyright law would take away the control over con-
sumer uses that resulted from the combined effect of the MAI decision, the practice of li-
censing rather than selling digital content, and the DMCA. This alone would make it
unacceptable to the content industries.
"I DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 195.
140 See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Music File Sharers Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/19/technology/19TUNE.html
(last visited Sept. 19, 2003); Katie Hafner, Is It Wrong to Share Your Music? (Discuss), N.Y.
TimEs, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/technology/circuits/
18kids.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
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highly readable, and even entertaining. It is a fascinating cultural his-
tory of copyright.
1. Early Copyright in England and the United States
It is clear early on, starting with the subtitle-"The Rise of Intel-
lectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity"-that the perspec-
tive in which Vaidhyanathan is most interested is that of authors
(including writers, musicians, and artists), and his book tells a story
built around their views and needs. The emphasis on authors might at
first lead one to expect that Vaidhyanathan would take a high-protec-
tion stance. Vaidhyanathan in fact reaches much the same conclusion
that Litman does, that copyright has become too protective of estab-
lished interests and has lost sight of its Constitutionally-mandated goal
"To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts. '' 141 In his
first chapter, Professor Vaidhyanathan provides a sort of layperson's
summary of American copyright law. It is reasonably accurate and in-
teresting, even for those knowledgeable about copyright law, because it
provides the perspective of a highly educated and intelligent non-law-
yer. For example, a section on the idea/expression dichotomy ponders
the nature and origin of meaning, something few copyright lawyers
pause to consider.
The book hits its stride in the second chapter, "Mark Twain and
the History of Literary Copyright." In it, Vaidhyanathan describes how
copyright originated, in a system designed for censorship by the Crown
and monopoly by the publisher. In 1557, Queen Mary issued a charter
to the Stationers' Company, which was thereby empowered to control
the book trade by allocating the rights to publish particular works
among the members of the Company. This early publishing right ex-
isted solely to prevent competition among publishers, 142 and while it
lasted, it was ideal for that purpose. But it was not to last. In 1694, the
licensing acts under which the Stationers' Company exercised its mo-
nopoly privileges expired. Because the publishers had no legally recog-
nized property interest, but merely a protection against competition,
the expiration of the Licensing Act spelled the end of their monopoly.
For the next 14 years, publishers competed against one another
over the same books. Soon, however, the publishers recognized that
allying with authors would enhance their chances of reclaiming a pub-
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142 "Publishers" as the term is understood today did not exist in the 16th century; never-
theless, early participants in the book trade did carry out the various functions of printing
and publishing and fairly early on began to specialize in ways reminiscent of today's market.
See LYMAN R. PATrERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 45-51 (1968).
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lishing monopoly. The ploy worked: Parliament took notice, and the
resulting statute (known as the Statute of Anne143) represented the first
recognition of author's rights in English law. For this reason it is often
called the "first copyright statute," although Vaidhyanathan notes that
its antecedents the Stationers Charter and the Licensing Acts are per-
haps more entitled to that distinction. 144 As a practical matter, though,
the nominal grant of rights to authors lacked substance-a "manuscript
is worth nothing on the market until the author assigns the rights to a
publisher.' 45 Like its predecessors, the Statute of Anne principally
benefitted publishers, granting them statutory monopolies for limited
times. Authors were merely straw men, expected to assign their rights
to publishers, who were enlisted by the publishers to enhance their case
before Parliament. 146 Nevertheless, for the publishers, asserting the
rights of authors was a brilliant tactic. It was so good, in fact, that it is
still employed today.147 Sometimes the claims are wildly implausible
(for example, that authors are likely to create more works if copyright
is extended to last not fifty, but seventy years after the author's
death); 148 at other times, the content industry simply lines up authors
143 8 Anne ch. 19 (1710), reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT App. 7 (2001).
144 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 40.
145 Id.
146 As Professor Alfred C. Yen has described it:
[The booksellers'] tactic succeeded. The resulting statute, the Statute of Anne, secured
for authors the exclusive right to print their works. . . . The Statute protected the inter-
ests of the booksellers by extending the exclusive rights to the assigns of authors as well.
The booksellers knew that their position in the market was such that authors would, as a
practical matter, be forced to sell their manuscripts to the Stationers' Company if they
wanted to get their work published at all.
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 517, 526 (1990).
147 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Piracy and peer-to-peer, CNET NEWS.COM (July 7, 2003),
available at http://news.com.com/2010-1071-1023325.html (last visited July 9, 2003) (Matt
Oppenheim, Senior Vice President of Business and Legal Affairs of the Recording Industry
Association of America: "How does [the struggle between the RIAA and P2P users] have
anything to do with corporations? This has to do with artists and creators. ").http://
news.com/2102-1027-1023325.html
148 In extending the term of copyright in 1998, "[m]embers of Congress expressed the
view that, as a result of increases in human longevity and in parents' average age when their
children are born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately secure 'the right to profit from
licensing one's work during one's lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing that
one's children-and perhaps their children-might also benefit from one's posthumous pop-
ularity.' 141 Cong. Rec. 6553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 207 n.14, 123 S.Ct. 769, 782 n.14. It seems implausible that authors are motivated
to any important degree by the prospect of providing for their grandchildren, not least be-
cause the present value of a dollar earned 50 years in the future is quite small, no more than
$0.0872 (assuming a discount rate of 5%). The present value of a dollar earned 50 years
after one's (yet-uncertain) date of death is smaller still. "[I]f an author expects to live 30
years after writing a book, the copyright extension (by increasing the copyright term from
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who support the industry's position, without arguing the specifics. 149
This is not to suggest that there is no community of interest between
authors and the content industry; obviously there is, at least for some
commercially successful authors. The point is rather that ever since the
publishers took the authors' case to Parliament, the content industry
has tended to assert the claims of individual authors, rather than its
own claims.
Early American copyright was based to a large extent on the law in
England. The English law itself, however, was for a time unclear
whether the authors' (and assignees') rights established in the Statute
of Anne were based on natural law, or on "economically-inspired statu-
tory law." 150 Whether natural law or statutory law is the foundation of
copyright matters, because, among other things, cases at the margin
may be decided differently depending on the law's source. Natural law
suggests that doubts should be resolved in favor of the owner; the law
of property, based on the concept of rivalrous land or chattels that can
be possessed by just one person at a time, tends to skew the outcomes
of cases toward the copyright owner. Copyright in this view is a sort of
Lockean justice, whereby something becomes the property of its crea-
tor and the law merely confirms what the owner is already entitled to
and specifies remedies for infringement. A statutory basis for copy-
right, on the other hand, implies a utilitarian approach that grants just
enough to the author to stimulate the production of creative works, for
the ultimate benefit of the public. In the early case of Millar v. Tay-
lor,151 two of the four justices held for the plaintiff based on natural law
principles, the third member of the majority decided for the plaintiff on
"life of the author plus 50 years" to "life of the author plus 70 years") increases the author's
[heirs'] expected income from that book-i.e., the economic incentive to write-by no more
than about 0.33%." Id. at 814 (Appendix to dissenting opinion of Breyer, J.).
141 "Congress heard testimony from a number of prominent artists; each expressed the
belief that the copyright system's assurance of fair compensation for themselves and their
heirs was an incentive to create." See, e.g., House Hearings 233-239 (statement of Quincy
Jones); Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 55-56 (1995) (statement of Bob Dylan); id. at 56-57
(statement of Don Henley); id. at 57 (statement of Carlos Santana)." Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15, 123 S.Ct. 769, 782 n.15; see also Lisa M. Bowman, Labels Aim Big
Guns at Small File Swappers, CNET News.com, June 25, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-
1027-1020876.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) ("The RIAA has lined up nearly three dozen
artists ... to support its plans to sue music fans.") at http://news.com/2102-1027_3-1020876.
html.
150 Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 528 (1990). It is a little difficult to understand how this question could
have been so unclear; before the Statute of Anne was enacted, the publishers had tried in
vain to have their supposed "natural right" to monopoly recognized. Perhaps it was believed
that authors might have a natural law right, while publishers did not.
151 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
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other grounds, and the fourth dissented. Five years later, however, in
the case of Donaldson v. Beckett,152 Millar was reversed and the idea
that natural law was a basis for copyright in England was discredited. 153
Based as it was on the English law, early American copyright law
was no more clear about its source.154 Eventually, however, in the case
of Wheaton v. Peters,55 the Supreme Court held that natural law con-
siderations were not important to the resolution of copyright cases and
that the foundation of American copyright was based on the Constitu-
tion and the Acts of Congress passed under the Constitution's
authority. 156
During the mid- and late nineteenth century, American readership
grew and Congress expanded copyright, both in duration and in terms
of the works protected. But by the turn of the century, some American
literary figures-including Mark Twain-were arguing for still-stronger
copyright. Professor Vaidhyanathan identifies Twain's 1906 testimony
before Congress as a pivotal moment in American copyright history.
Twain, then at the end of his career, sought "maximum protection for
authors, the thickest possible copyright.' 5 7 While Twain's views were
largely ignored in the Copyright Act of 1909, Vaidhyanathan notes that
at the beginning of the 21st century, American copyright law is begin-
ning to resemble Twain's "Continental value system of authorship. '1 58
Indeed, Vaidhyanathan devotes a good deal of ink to describing the
copyright views of Mark Twain, and how they changed over time.159 In
contrast to the later Twain, he tells us, the early Twain favored very thin
(less-protective) copyright. What might account for this shift? Inexpli-
cably Vaidhyanathan concludes that the difference between the early
and the late Twain is attributable to Twain's keen appreciation of the
152 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
153 See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Explod-
ing the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1156-71 (1983).
154 See Benjamin Kaplan, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF CoPYRImrr 12-16, 26-27 (1968);
Mark Rose, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 67-112 (1993). Some
have concluded that both natural law and utilitarian bases underlie the constitutional Copy-
right Clause. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Au-
tonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,
10 (1994); Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too
Long?, 18 CARDOzO ARTS & Ewr. L.J. 651, 696 (2000) (remarks of Jane C. Ginsburg); see
also Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 262 n.55
(1997).
155 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
156 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 656-61.
157 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 37.
158 Id. at 36.
159 Id. at 58-80.
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difference between "piracy" and "plagiarism. ' 160 But how can that dif-
ference account for the change in Twain's views over time? Any dis-
tinction between piracy and plagiarism might well have been as clear to
the younger Twain as to the older. Even if Twain's understanding of
this distinction became more refined as he grew older, the reader is left
to guess just how piracy and plagiarism would make Twain change his
view about the merits of thin versus thick copyright. Finally, in the
penultimate sentence of the chapter, Vaidhyanathan provides a more
plausible explanation for the change in Twain's views on copyright:
"Only near the end of [Twain's] life did self-interest ... trump his con-
cern for future authors and artists. '161 Ultimately, then, he identifies
self-interest as the factor that changed Twain's mind. But even this is
unsatisfying. Was the younger Twain really less self-interested than the
older? Perhaps, but Vaidhyanathan does not make this case.
A better explanation might look a little deeper at Twain's status
over the years. Let us assume that Twain at all times acted in a manner
both reasonable and self-interested. We can surmise that Twain acted
in a way that he perceived to be to his benefit, but also with a decent
regard for his reputation and his humanity. Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, is there a plausible explanation of his changing view of copy-
right? Certainly one thing that changed as his views were changing was
his relative copyright "wealth"-that is, the number and value of his
copyrights. The younger Twain was relatively copyright-poor; the
older, rather copyright-rich. Indeed, this alone could explain Twain's
changing views of copyright. If a copyright-poor author prefers thinner
copyright, while a copyright-rich author prefers thicker, more-protec-
tive copyright, we might explain Twain's views without resorting to ei-
ther a distinction between piracy and plagiarism or an increase in self-
interest. Moreover, there is reason to suppose that authors' views on
copyright do vary depending on their relative copyright wealth. The
copyright-poor are more interested in preserving the raw materials for
their future creations than they are in protecting the few works they
have already created. The copyright-rich, by contrast, have "arrived."
They have little to gain from maximizing the chances for their future
success; by hypothesis, they have already succeeded. Protecting their
existing work against real or imagined depredations would make sense.
160 Id. at 67-69. By "piracy," Vaidhyanathan means copyright infringement. "Piracy is an
offense created by the notion of copyright. It could not exist as a concept without the
granted monopoly of copyright that it violates." Id. at 67. Vaidhyanathan indentifies plagia-
rism as something "older and more complex .... A writer can use a small portion of an-
other's work, yet fail to credit the source, and be accused of plagiarism. . . . [It] is more
often than not an unrequested and uncredited use of another's ideas." Id. at 67-68.
161 Id. at 80.
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This explanation of the change in Twain's views could gain support
from the actions of other authors and the content industry. Is there a
pattern in which the copyright-poor take one position, and then, when
success arrives, do an about-face? Although Professor Vaidhyanathan
does not identify such a pattern, he does provide us the raw material
from which we ourselves might draw some conclusions.
2. Content Industries-The Poor Get Rich
In Chapter 3, "Celluloid Copyright and Derivative Works, or How
to Stop 12 Monkeys with One Chair," Vaidhyanathan takes on
Hollywood, beginning with the observation that in its early days, the
motion picture industry "had an interest in allowing free and easy adap-
tation of works from copyright-rich literary authors, such as Mark
Twain and Jack London. As the industry grew more lucrative ... stu-
dios found themselves on the plaintiff's side in copyright suits."'1 62
Here, then, we might find some confirmation: As Hollywood grew from
a copyright-poor upstart to a copyright-rich member of the establish-
ment, its views about copyright changed. It might well be that the key
to understanding the seemingly contradictory positions taken over time
by Hollywood, and earlier by Mark Twain, is the change from copyright
poverty to copyright wealth.
But even when addressing Hollywood, Vaidhyanathan never quite
makes this point. For example, in describing modern Hollywood, he
tells us that Hollywood executives "sometimes still act as though they
are copyright-poor as a way to get 'copyright-richer,' or just plain
richer. '163 But Hollywood is not acting copyright-poor. The copyright-
poor Hollywood was always a copyright defendant, never a plaintiff;
the copyright-poor Hollywood always argued for less protection, never
more.164 Today's copyright-rich Hollywood is merely acting as one
would expect the copyright-rich to act, vigorously asserting its copy-
rights and demanding more protection 165 while taking as much as it can
162 Id. at 82.
163 Id.
164 See DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 40-41. Once Hollywood gained some copy-
right wealth, it "became increasingly uncomfortable with the formalities of a copyright stat-
ute written without attention to [its] needs"; the result was a series of private conferences
among industry participants "to work out a consensus on copyright revision." Id. at 42. The
revision was stalled, however, by the failure to invite all of the various affected industries,
and by the growth of new industries, notably radio, which had their own agendas to pursue.
Id. at 42-45.
165 Hollywood has been in the forefront of content industry demands for expanded copy-
right protection. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. S 4884, S 4885 (1998) ("the DMCA enjoys wide-
spread support from the motion picture, recording, software, and publishing industries
.... ); 144 Cong. Rec. H 7074, H 7103 ("This legislation [the DMCA] protects our nation's
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from any available source. Wanting to have it both ways is not acting
copyright-poor. The copyright-poor do not demand stronger copyright
from Congress-that is what the copyright-rich do, whether in the per-
son of Mark Twain, or the Walt Disney Company. 166 To the copyright-
poor, the copyright wealth of others feels oppressive. But to the copy-
right-rich, more protection is better.
Sentiments about copyright are thus dynamic: persons, industries,
and nations can change from copyright-poor to copyright-rich (and,
theoretically at least, from copyright-rich to copyright-poor 167). When
movie producers .... ). Indeed, during the passage of the DMCA, Hollywood successfully
lobbied at the last minute for the inclusion of mandatory anti-copying technology even in
analog videocassette recorders. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (prohibition against trafficking in
VHS videocassette recorders unless they conform to the "automatic gain control copy con-
trol technology"); 144 Cong. Rec. S 11887, S 11890 ("there are provisions in Title I [of the
DMCA] that address certain technologies used to control copying of motion pictures in ana-
log form on video cassette recorders which were not part of either the original Senate or
House DMCA bills."). In court, Hollywood studios were the plaintiffs in the first cases
extending copyright protection to the "total concept and feel" of copyrighted works. See 4
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (2000). "Total concept and feel" protection was extended to
to greeting cards in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970),
and to non-theatrical audiovisual works in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). In 1990, a federal district court in Massa-
chusetts extended the concept, now called "look and feel," to software user interfaces. Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). Lotus thus had
established a precedent by defeating Paperback Software (an adversary much smaller and
less-well-financed than itself). Lotus immediately put the precedent to work by suing Bor-
land Corp., a much more formidable opponent, on the same "look and feel" theory of in-
fringement. The case produced no fewer than four district court opinions, which ultimately
held that Borland had infringed the "look and feel" of Lotus's user interface. The First
Circuit reversed, finding the user interface to be a "method of operation" excluded from
copyright by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Supreme Court, after granting Lotus's petition for
certiorari, affirmed by an equally divided vote. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D.
Mass. 1992); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1993); Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st
Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
166 See Michael Freedman, Supreme Court Upholds Copyright Extension, Forbes.com, Jan.
15, 2003, at http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/15/cz mf0115copyright.html (last visited Sep-
tember 17, 2003) ("In the face of intense lobbying from The Walt Disney Co. and other
companies, Congress passed the [Copyright Term Extension Act] in 1998, making corporate
copyrights good for 95 years ....").
167 The change from copyright-rich to copyright-poor is much less common, but does oc-
cur sometimes as the result of transfers made by authors to publishers. See, e.g., Fantasy,
Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd, 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (pos-
sible that author can infringe own copyright, transferred earlier); Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.
930 (2d Cir. 1914) (photographer held to infringe earlier, transferred work); see also Schiller
& Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). Both Fogerty and Gross
involved efforts by the transferee to prevent the author from creating new works, which can
have the effect not merely of making the author copyright-poor as to past works but also
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they do, their views of copyright change. Vaidhyanathan expresses a
worthy sentiment when he says, "[c]opyright should not be meant for
Rupert Murdoch, Michael Eisner and Bill Gates at the expense of the
rest of us. Copyright should be for students, teachers, readers, library
patrons, researchers, freelance writers, emerging musicians and experi-
mental artists.1168 But of course, some of those students, teachers, and
others will become copyright-rich eventually-and when that happens,
their views will likely change. At one time, the ranks of "emerging
musicians" included the members of the rock group Metallica, which in
those early days permitted fans freely to record its concerts and trade
the live tapes they made.' 69 Years later, when the group was copyright-
rich, it took a highly public stance against Napster, and its members
filed suit personally against the proprietors of that P2P network. 170
Vaidhyanathan turns to the popular music business in "Hep Cats
and Copy Cats," his fourth chapter. Here he emphasizes the African-
American blues tradition, out of which grew jazz, rock, disco, rap, and
virtually all else that is original about American pop music. He notes
that American musical creativity-which, more often than not, means
African-American musical creativity-has been at least as much about
style and performance as it has been about composition. Improvisa-
tion, rather than formal composition, has been the chief strength and
most widely-imitated feature of American popular music.1 7' Improvi-
keeping the author copyright-poor by directly interfering with the ability to create new
works.
168 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 5.
169 "[T]he band couldn't think of a good reason to forbid taping" and frequently supplied
a designated "tapers' section" behind the sound board so that fans could record a concert,
take photos and shoot videos. CHRIS CROCKER, METALLICA: THE FRAYED ENDS OF METAL
197-98 (1998). The only other band to allow this type of taping was the Grateful Dead. Id.
170 See Geoff Boucher, Metallica's Rocky L.A. Road, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at A6;
Ron Harris, Metallica demands Napster cut off 335,000 song-traders, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS,
May 8, 2000, at D5; Associated Press, Metallica Demands on-Line Service Dump Illegal Song
Traders, CHI. TRm., May 4, 2000, at 16. Predictably, some less copyright-rich musicians
spoke out in favor of Napster. See Courtney Love, Courtney Love does the Math, at http://
archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2003); Janis Ian, The
Internet Debacle-An Alternative View, at http://www.janisian.com/articles.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003).
171 In the past, improvisation was practiced by musicians in Europe, notably during the
Baroque era when harpsichordists were expected to improvise complex parts based only on
"figured bass" notation (which provided a skeletal roadmap to the music and indicated
which chord inversions the composer wanted the performer to play). Since the end of the
Baroque era, however, improvisation has played little if any role in European music; musical
creativity is considered to be situated more in the work of the composer than the performer.
Certainly there is a role for interpretation, but interpretation and improvisation are not the
same thing. The former is found in the subtle shadings that cannot be written down; the
latter is the music. While there are virtuosi whose instrumental performances attract crowds
regardless of what they play, for the most part the musician's task is faithfully to recreate
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sation has been central to American music since at least the heyday of
the Dixieland bands, playing the funeral music of turn-of-the-century
New Orleans. Dixieland bands included numerous musicians improvis-
ing melodies at the same time; what held it all together were the chords,
which formed a structure within which each soloist improvised a mel-
ody. Blues was another improvisational style, based on a single chord
progression 172 that by 1910 was known to all from Memphis to New
Orleans to Chicago and points north. But in improvised performance,
the basic blues chords reveal countless inflections, and have proven ca-
pable of supporting profound emotional expression. When blues per-
formers played the "standards" with their own, personal style-their
own inflection and emotion-they became not merely craftsmen, but
artists. The music wasn't complete until it had been played and the
solos improvised. Each performance was something entirely new, dif-
ferent from those before and those after, and the performer, not the
song, was often the chief attraction.
Jazz, which closely followed Dixieland, is the most-recognized
American music based on improvisation. In jazz, although blues tunes
were often used as the basis for improvisation, almost any music could
and did serve as a starting point. One common jazz technique was to
take popular music and "jazz it up." Because popular songs had a wide
variety of chord structures, the jazz musician had more raw material
with which to start than did blues players. Nevertheless, four or five
dozen "standards" found (and still find) their way into the repertoire of
most jazz performers. Jazz performers borrowed the blues technique of
starting with a chord structure and a melody, and then making it one's
own through performance and improvisation.
How would the music most distinctively American-Dixieland, the
blues, and jazz-fare under the modern American copyright regime?
Professor Vaidhyanathan suggests it would not do well.17 3 Today, the
exclusive right afforded authors to create derivative works could
sharply limit the ability of later performers and composers to play and
write their songs, as the chord progressions, melodies, tempos, and
what the composer had written in the way the conductor wanted to hear it. And so, after the
Baroque era, improvisation became a lost art in European and "serious" American music.
Not until African-American musicians began to play Dixieland did improvisation return as a
substantial expression of musical creativity. Today, improvisation is rare outside jazz (and
occasionally pop) music.
172 "[Tlhe Blues always consists of twelve bars divided into three equal parts, with a dif-
ferent chord for each 4-bar section." E. Simms Campbell, The Spirit of the Blues, in Es-
QUIRE'S WORLD OF JAZZ (1975 ed.) at 23. Authentic blues always follows the chord pattern
I-'V-V.
173 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 123.
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overall similarity of expression would in many cases be too close to
those of the first composer. Vaidhyanathan is correct when he points
out that American musical creativity, with its roots in an African-
American culture of improvisation and performance, is poorly served
by American copyright law. In American music, what matters most is
the performance.
To modern audiences, the importance of performance is perhaps
nowhere as apparent as it is in the case of rap music, with its heavy
emphasis on "sampling" of the recordings of others, in a process of
transformation that often makes the sampled works unrecognizable.
Professor Vaidhyanathan devotes a dozen or so pages to rap music's
uneasy relationship with copyright law, beginning with rap's assault on
copyright, followed by copyright's revenge as lawsuits based on sam-
pling succeeded.174 Today, sampling has become commonplace, but the
samples are licensed by the sampler's record company.175 Thus, rap
artists without content industry support typically infringe, by sampling
without licenses; as soon as they gain record company support, licenses
must be obtained.1 76
Vaidhyanathan's chapter on the American popular music business
provides perhaps the strongest support for his thesis that copyright is
restricting and inhibiting American culture and creativity. It is clear
that postmodern genres of art that depend on images, sounds, and
other elements from popular culture for their vocabulary are
threatened by the expansion of copyright. 177 Unfortunately, Vaidhy-
anathan sometimes sacrifices doctrinal consistency for the sake of a
point. For example, he tells the story of the 1985 dispute between the
rock group Led Zeppelin and the legendary blues composer Willie
Dixon. Seventeen years before, the (then copyright-poor) Led
Zeppelin on its 1968 debut had properly credited two songs to Dixon.
174 "Success" in this context includes out-of-court settlements as much as victories in
court. Vaidhyanathan cites a dispute between two former members of The Turtles and the
group De La Soul, in which the latter paid the former some $1.7 million as a settlement.
Regarding litigation, he refers mainly to Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
175 See Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law, liME-
DIA LAW AND POLICY 12 (Fall 2002); Ronald Gaither, The Chillin' Effect of Section 506: The
Battle Over Digital Sampling in Rap Music, 3 Vanderbilt J. Enter. L. & Practice 195 (2001).
176 See Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
177 In the 1980's and 1990's, there was a genre of visual art called "appropriation art" that
had troubles similar to those of rap music. Because it was based on the recasting of existing
materials, it inevitably wound up risking infringement litigation. The genre was sued out of
existence. See Schaumann, supra note 154. Rap has been more successful, because, unlike
appropriation art, rap has the support of the content industry.
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On its second album, however, the group did not credit Dixon for the
song "Whole Lotta Love," resulting in a lawsuit settled in 1987 for an
undisclosed payment to Dixon. Vaidhyanathan, disapproving of the
suit, concludes that "both songs do share some lyrics, but they both
take elements from the deep well of the blues tradition. What's more,
the two songs have completely different 'feels.' . . . They are very
different songs.' 78 But just nine pages earlier Vaidhyanathan told us
that American culture has suffered great harm under the "total concept
and feel" theory of copyright infringement claimed by Hollywood. 179 If
"feel" shouldn't be the basis for a copyright lawsuit, should it be a de-
fense to one? Vaidhyanathan never addresses this point.
All the same, when he is talking about American music, Vaidhy-
anathan is at his best, and this chapter is a fascinating excursion into the
cultural impact of copyright. Here, he puts his finger on the dynamic of
copyright change: "The tension in the law is not between urban lower
class and corporate uiberclass. It's not between black artists and white
record executives. . . . It is in fact a struggle between the established
entities in the music business and those trying to get established.' 8 0
Once again, we are looking at the struggle between the copyright-rich
and the copyright-poor, and what happens when the latter become the
former.
3. The Future
In the final chapter ("The Digital Moment") Vaidhyanathan at-
tempts to apply what has gone before to make some normative claims
about what should be the future of copyright. He begins promisingly,
with the statement that digitization and networking have "collapsed
some important distinctions that had existed in the American copyright
system for most of the twentieth century."''1 Certainly, as he points
out, the distinction between "reading" and "copying" a digital work has
disappeared. 8 2 Similarly, the distinction between producers and con-
sumers has been eroded, if not "collapsed," by digitization and
networking. This is in large part due to the open access to distribution
channels provided by the internet.18 3 But many of his statements here
are indecipherable. He asserts, for example, that "[c]onverting Mo-
178 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 123.
179 Id. at 114; see supra note 161.
... COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 133.
18' Id. at 152.
182 This is the result of the decision in the MAI case. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Com-
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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zart's Jupiter Symphony into a series of ones and zeros has collapsed
the idea-expression dichotomy."'84 Why a digital medium erodes the
(admittedly, sometimes hazy) distinction between idea and expression
is left to the reader. He continues, "[p]erhaps the ones and zeros are
ideas, and the analog versions we inhale are the expressions. ' 185 Per-
haps-but why would we consider the ones and zeros to be ideas? And
if they were, whose ideas would they be? Certainly not Mozart's. 186
Are the and zeros more "idea" than are the analog grooves in a vinyl
LP record? A little later, having sub silentio abandoned his position, he
asks, "if strings of ones and zeros operate as an alphabet, a code, for
representing ideas, shouldn't they enjoy status as expressions? Are
strings of digital code worthy of both copyright protection and First
Amendment protection? 1 87 But his copyright questions were an-
swered twenty years ago,188 and a consensus existed as to the First
Amendment status of computer code long before the question was re-
solved by courts in 2000 and 2001.189 All too often, Vaidhyanathan
seems to be out of his depth with this material, especially when con-
trasted with Litman's mastery of copyright nuances.
But Vaidhyanathan does identify some questions worthy of discus-
sion, even if he doesn't build a normative case for their resolution. He
argues that recent history has seen "four surrenders" 190 of important
safeguards of public rights: (1) balance (the traditional copyright
model) was surrendered to control (via digital rights management) by
the DMCA; (2) the public interest was surrendered to private interest,
visible in the rhetoric of "property" and "theft" from the content indus-
tries; (3) republican deliberation was surrendered to unelected, multi-
184 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 152.
185 Id.
186 Vaidhyanathan (though it's hard to be sure) appears to be struggling with the idea that
a fixation of sounds might not be perceptible without the aid of a machine or device. But it
is elementary that such fixations are protectable in copyright law, and acting as if this were
unclear doesn't advance public understanding of copyright. Perhaps public understanding is
too much to ask in any event.
187 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 152 (emphasis added).
188 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir.
1983) (programs in binary code protectable); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Remeirdes, 111 F.Supp. 2d 294, 326 (2000) ("Principally those familiar with the particular
programming language will understand the source code expression. And only a relatively
small number of skilled programmers and computer scientists will understand the machine
readable object code. But each form expresses the same idea, albeit in different ways")
(emphasis added), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001).
189 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2001) (machine
code can be "speech"); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2000) (source code con-
sidered "speech").
190 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 159-60.
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lateral non-governmental organizations (for example, the World
Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization);
and (4) culture was surrendered to technology, again via the DMCA
(meaning that "leaky" copyright permits culture to grow in the margins,
while digital rights management-even when it doesn't work-exposes
copyright-poor authors to legal liability that is clear-cut and admits of
no defense). There is little question that each of these deserves a public
discussion. If Copyrights and Copywrongs facilitates that discussion, it
will be a success, even if not all the copyright details are quite right.
IV. THE COPYRIGHT-RICH GET RICHER
Litman and Vaidhyanathan address roughly the same period in
American copyright history, but each emphasizes a different conse-
quence of the development of the law. Litman focuses on the conse-
quences to the (copyright-poor) consumer, which result predictably
from the process of copyright lawmaking. Vaidhyanathan deals prima-
rily with the consequences to creativity and the impact on new (and
therefore copyright-poor) authors of copyright policy that increasingly
entrenches the copyright-rich. Litman appears content to leave authors
with the rest of the content industry; she dismisses the incentive func-
tion of copyright as "a useful thought tool.., that [doesn't] straightfor-
wardly describe[ ] the real world." 191 But authors must figure into the
copyright calculus somewhere. "Balances" and "bargains" are critical
parts of the American system of copyright, to be sure, but focusing only
on consumers and what is happening to their interests omits the crea-
tive side of the copyright equation. There is something to be said,
therefore, for reading these books together. If one had to choose be-
tween them, copyright lawyers, and perhaps most lawyers, will likely
find Litman's book more satisfying than Vaidhyanathan's. The latter
raises too many unanswered questions to please those of us indoctri-
nated into legal modes of thought.192 Non-lawyers, on the other hand,
may well prefer Vaidhyanathan's breezy style and anecdotes, which,
191 DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 80.
192 As Litman notes, only a little jokingly:
Copyright lawyers are a peculiarly myopic breed of human being. There is something
fundamental about coming to understand that the current law may make it technically
illegal to watch a movie and then imagine what it would have looked like if the studio
had cast some other actor in the leading role, that renders one unfit for ordinary reflec-
tive thinking.
Id. at 22 (footnote omitted). The possibility that a derivative work could be created without
tangible fixation accounts for possible "infringement by imagining." See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)
(2000) (author has exclusive right to prepare derivative work, rather than a right to
reproduce, distribute, etc.).
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though not as incisive as Litman's analysis, do quite a good job of con-
veying the essential issues and tensions in American copyright today.
Reading the books together, however, is undoubtedly the way to get
the most out of each, and is especially interesting because taken to-
gether the books show that consumers' and authors' interests are not
inevitably in opposition.
Both books suggest, though neither one explicitly states, that the
principal tension in American copyright exists between the copyright-
rich and the copyright-poor. Those that have valuable copyrights tend
to want more protection; the threat of digital distribution arouses enor-
mous fears that the business model upon which the content industries
were built will disappear and with it, the industries themselves. The
copyright-rich therefore seek as much protection as their well-funded
lobbyists and lawyers can muster, and use public relations as a tool to
indoctrinate the copyright-poor into the belief that unauthorized use of
copyrighted work is "stealing." The latter (including consumers and
new artists, authors, and musicians), for their part, are losing ground as
industry efforts to maintain and extend protection steadily erode the
public domain and the rights of the public to access and use copy-
righted works. At the moment, it seems, Congress and the courts are
for the most part disposed to give the copyright-rich the protection they
seek; the rhetoric of "property" and "theft" dominates the copyright
discourse.
But copyright wasn't meant only, or even mainly, to protect the
copyright-rich. Copyright's mandate, to "promote the progress of sci-
ence," is more about increasing the public dissemination of expression.
This is a prerequisite for democratic government and an enlightened
society.193 The prevailing copyright climate of ever-more protection fo-
cuses on providing and defending incentives for commercial distribu-
tion, even as it justifies reducing or eliminating access by those
unwilling or unable to pay a fee. Dissemination disserves its constitu-
tional purposes when access is limited to those who can pay the pub-
lisher's price. 194
19 "[C]opyright serves fundamentally to promote democratic governance by promoting
the dissemination of information, supporting independent media, and venerating individual
self-expression." Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 217, 220 (1998); see also sources cited id. n.10.
194 Some will object that in 1789 books were not given away, nor need they be today.
However, libraries and archives served the needs of those who could not afford to build
large collections of books. By eliminating fair use (and quite possibly the first sale doctrine),
the DMCA promotes a society where simply accessing information will carry a price.
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But there may be some hope still. A review of developments since
2001 shows that although many battles have been won by those seeking
maximum protection, the tide may still turn toward the copyright-poor.
A. Recent Copyright Legislation
On the legislative front, the news for consumers and the copyright-
poor is generally bad. While bills that would benefit the copyright-
poor 195 are about equal in number to those designed to benefit the cop-
yright-rich, the content industry supports only the latter. Given the
pattern of copyright lawmaking in the last 100 years, in which no bill
without the support of substantially all the affected industries can pass,
it is hard to be optimistic about the prospect for legislative reform.
Following the pattern of the DMCA, some of the new industry-
supported bills would prohibit the use (or, in some cases, the posses-
195 The pro-public bills include three that are designed to mandate disclosure to consum-
ers of access, reproduction, or distribution control technologies, because such technologies
might violate the reasonable expectations of consumers regarding the content they acquire.
See S. 692, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (2003); H.R. 107, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (2003); S.
1621, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(c) (2003). The last of these would also (I) prohibit the FCC
from mandating access or redistribution control technologies for devices utilizing digital
works, S. 1621, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (2003); (ii) eliminate the right of copyright owners
to compel disclosure of personal consumer information from internet service providers for
purposes of enforcing copyright, id. § 5; and (iii) preserve secondary markets for used digital
media products by prohibiting technology used to defeat the first sale doctrine, id. § 6. The
"Public Access to Science Act" would restrict copyright in works "produced pursuant to
scientific research substantially funded by the Federal Government." H.R. 2613, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). The "Public Domain Enhancement Act," introduced on June 25,
2003 by Reps. Lofgren and Doolittle, would require the payment of a nominal fee to the
Copyright Office in order to continue the copyright in a published United States work for
longer than 50 years after the date of its first publication. H.R. 2601, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2003). Finally, the Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Ex-
pectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003 was introduced by Reps. Lofgren and Boucher on
March 4, 2003. H.R.1066, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). The BALANCE Act would make
explicit that fair use of a work can include analog and digital transmissions. Id. § 3(a). It
would also make clear that copyright is not infringed when the lawful possessor of a copy of
a work reproduces, stores, adapts, or accesses the work for either archival purposes or for
the purpose of performing or displaying the work privately. License terms to the contrary
would be unenforceable. Id. § 3(b). The Act would make the first sale doctrine expressly
applicable to digital formats, provided the "owner of a particular copy" or her designee does
not retain a copy of the work. Id. § 4. This provision is problematic in that the widespread
practice of licensing, rather than selling, many digital works sharply limit the number of
"owners" of digital copies. Although CDs are still sold, rather than licensed, the provision
would not apply to digital conversions (for example, to the MP3 format) of CDs because its
language limits applicability to cases in which the "work is ... sold or otherwise disposed of
in its original format." Id. Finally, the BALANCE Act would expressly allow the circum-
vention of access controls and the provision of technology to circumvent access controls if
the technology is used to make a non-infringing use of the protected work-as long as the
copyright holder "fails to make publicly available the necessary means to make such non-
infringing use without additional cost or burden." Id. § 5.
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sion) of technology that can be used to reproduce or distribute copy-
righted works in digital formats. Consider, for example, the
misleadingly-named Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protec-
tion and Security (ACCOPS) Act of 2003.196 This bill would make it a
felony to place a single copyrighted work "on a computer network ac-
cessible to members of the public who are able to copy the work
through such access."'1 97 It would further criminalize offering P2P
software for download unless the offeror first "clearly and conspicu-
ously warn[s] any person downloading that software, before it is
downloaded, that it... could create a security and privacy risk for the
user's computer. '198
In a similar vein, the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of
2003199 requires the Director of the FBI to "develop a program to deter
members of the public from committing acts of infringement by (A)
offering on the Internet copies of copyrighted works, or (B) making
copies of copyrighted works from the Internet. ' 200 Certainly deter-
rence will be difficult when, as a result of the MAI decision, merely
viewing infringing works on one's computer constitutes "making copies
of copyrighted works from the Internet." Perhaps even more chilling,
the bill instructs the FBI Director to "facilitate the sharing among law
enforcement agencies, Internet service providers, and copyright owners
of information concerning [such] activities."'20 1 Moreover, the innocu-
ous-sounding "facilitated sharing" of information described in the bill is
far from "sharing." Rather, it amounts to coercion of ISPs, which in
general don't want to share information about their customers with
copyright owners. Although the RIAA's attempt to force Verizon to
disclose subscriber information because of alleged copyright infringe-
196 H.R. 2752, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c108:H.R.2752: (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (the "ACCOPS Act"). The bill was in-
troduced in the House on July 17, 2003, by Representatives Conyers, Berman, Schiff,
Meehan, Wexler, and Weiner, all members of the House Judiciary Committee.
197 ACCOPS Act § 301.
198 ACCOPS Act § 302. Warning users of possible dangers is a good idea. There are,
however, many serious security and privacy risks in other (non-P2P) software, for example in
the Windows operating system. See, e.g., Katie Hafner & Kirk Semple, Fearing P.C. Havoc,
Gumshoes Hunt Down a Virus, N.Y. Tim s, Aug. 23, 2003, at Cl; Kirk Semple, Computer
Worm Widely Attacks Windows Versions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 13, 2003, at Cl. Selectively im-
posing a warning requirement on P2P software seems an obvious attempt to scare users
away from technology that the content industry doesn't like.
19' H.R. 2517, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c108:H.R.2517: (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
200 H.R. 2517, supra note 195, § 3.
201 Id.
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ment of Verizon subscribers succeeded at trial,20 2 Verizon has ap-
pealed. Later efforts to force other ISP's to provide subscriber
information are being contested by the ISP's. 20 3 The bill contemplates
that internet service providers will-or will be forced to-cooperate
with the content industry by revealing subscribers whose online activi-
ties the content owners have monitored.
These bills follow similar legislation introduced in 2002, including a
bill introduced by Senator Hollings that would have required "any
hardware or software that reproduces copyrighted works in digital
form" to include built-in copy prevention systems.20 4 The Hollings bill
seriously underestimated the penetration of digital technology into
American society. By requiring copy prevention systems based on re-
production of works in digital form, it would have regulated many more
items than just computers (including talking dog collars, Barbie's Travel
Train, cockpit voice recorders, musical car horns, and many others).20 5
Another bill introduced in 2002 would immunize copyright holders
from liability for "disabling... or otherwise impairing the unauthorized
202 Recording Indus. Ass'n v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 244 (D.D.C.
2003) (denying Verizon's motion to quash subpoena), on appeal, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
11250.
203 See Amy Harmon, Efforts to Stop Music Swapping Draw More Fire, N.Y. TiMEs, Au-
gust 1, 2003, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2003/08/01/business/01MUSI.html?
tntemaill (last visited August 1, 2003) (SBC Communications has filed a lawsuit challenging
the constitutionality of the subpoenas obtained by the record industry seeking subscriber
information).
204 Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong., 2d
Sess., available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:S.2048: (last visited Sept. 29,
2003). See Freedom To Tinker: Fritz's Hit List (Dec. 8, 2002), available at http://www.free-
dom-to-tinker.com/archives/cat-fritzs-hit-list.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
205 Freedom to Tinker, supra note 185. The Hollings bill is an example of an attempt to
restrict technology so far that the restriction becomes unworkable on its face. The DMCA
came close to this when it prohibited trafficking in technologies that circumvent access con-
trols used by content owners. Because "technologies" include software, trafficking in
software that can circumvent access controls is a DMCA violation. Even telling others
where to find such software can be a violation. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Simply wearing a T-Shirt printed with source code that
can be compiled into a program that circumvents access controls may be a DMCA violation,
insofar as it is "provid[ing] ... [a] technology" that circumvents access. Such T-Shirts are
widely for sale. See, e.g., http://www.copyleft.net/item.phtml?dynamic=l&referer=%2Fitem.
phtml%3Fdynamic%3D1%26page%3DproductL271front.phtml&page=product 1174_
front.phtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). The point is that in the world of containerless con-
tent, technology may be nothing more than information. So, by attempting to restrict tech-
nology, the DMCA is actually attempting to restrict information. The practical difficulties of
this effort are revealed by the immense variety of objects and texts that on their face seem to
violate the DMCA by revealing how to circumvent access controls. Dozens of examples
appear at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/Gallery/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2003). These
include versions of the access-circumvention code set to music, dramatic readings, square-
dance, and many other implementations.
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distribution... of ... copyrighted work" on a P2P network.20 6 Even
non-infringing files may be impaired "as may be reasonably necessary"
to impair allegedly infringing files. 20 7 Evidently destruction of non-in-
fringing material is acceptable, if it is necessary to stop infringement. It
is tempting to dismiss this as an isolated and extreme case, but that
might be a mistake: In 2003, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee (which has jurisdiction over copyright
issues) told witnesses at a committee hearing that he favored destroying
the computers of those suspected of online copyright infringement.208
Questioned about his statement, he later said by way of explanation
that "I do not favor extreme remedies-unless no moderate remedies
can be found. °20 9 Even so, the Senator's statement remains an en-
dorsement of "extreme measures" up to and including the destruction
of consumers' computers by the content industry.
B. Copyright's Redemption?
Recent developments, then, suggest that Professors Litman and
Vaidhyanathan are correct. Proposed copyright legislation has been
dangerous both to consumer interests and to creativity; the ability of
consumers and authors to access content and create new content may
be even more restricted tomorrow than it is today. But there is a devel-
opment, also predicted by Professor Litman, that may yet change the
direction of copyright. This is the litigation brought by the RIAA
against consumers who use P2P networks to distribute music files.210
The last paragraph of Professor Litman's book reads:
People don't obey laws they don't believe in. Governments find it
difficult to enforce laws that only a handful of people obey. Laws
that people don't obey and that governments don't enforce are not
much use to the interests that persuaded Congress to enact them. If a
law is bad enough, even its proponents might be willing to abandon it
in favor of a different law that seems more legitimate to the people it
is intended to command. Even if copyright stakeholders refuse to
206 H.R. 5211, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(a) (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c107:H.R.5211: (last visited July 26, 2003).
207 Id.
208 Senator Takes Aim at Illegal Downloads, USAToday.com, June 19, 2003, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-06-18-hatch-wants-computers-dead-x.
htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
209 Hatch Comments on Copyright Enforcement, available at http://www.senate.gov/-
hatch/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleaseid=205147 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2003).
210 See supra notes 106-135 and accompanying text.
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give the public a seat at the bargaining table, they may discover that
they need to behave as if they had.211
We may now be facing precisely this situation. In an effort to deter the
widespread distribution of copyrighted sound recordings, the recording
industry has filed hundreds of lawsuits against consumers. Defendants
have included a twelve-year-old girl living in public housing in New
York City212 and a 66-year-old retired schoolteacher (who denies ever
having downloaded any music or letting anyone else do So).213 The
cases have attracted an enormous amount of publicity214 and have
sparked public concern, including a hearing called by Senator Norm
Coleman, chair of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations.2 5 It seems that enforcement
of copyright law against consumers has attracted the kind of attention
that Professor Litman predicted: For the first time in almost 100 years,
Congress is paying attention and the rights of consumers to use copy-
righted works are the subject of a public discussion.
It is too early to predict where the public attention to copyright
might lead. It could result in a copyright law that addresses the rights
of the public to make use of works of authorship; a law that provides an
incentive for creation and distribution of works of authorship without
restricting the flow of information necessary for a democratic society
and an informed electorate; a law that supports the artists who help
create a vibrant culture without stifling the next generation of artists
who will remake the culture into their own artistic vision. In Professor
Vaidhyanathan's words: "Maybe some summer not too many years
from now a young woman will enjoy a performance of Appalachian
Spring and will be inspired to borrow from it to create a life of creativ-
ity and beauty. '' 216 If this is the result, then we will have reason to
rejoice. But the recording industry lawsuits might also have their in-
tended effect: the public might simply accept that one must never use
211 DIGITAL CoPYRIGr, supra note 13, at 195.
212 See John Borland, P2P group: We'll pay girl's RIAA bill, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 10,
2003, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5074227.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003);
Reuters, Music Firms, DJ Offer to Pay 12-Year-Old's Fine, at http://www.nytimes.com/
reuters/arts/entertainment-media-music-lawsuit.html) (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
213 See John Schwartz, She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/25/business/media/25TUNE.html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
214 The author has copies of 48 stories from the New York Times alone directly addressing
the recording industry's litigation against P2P users, between May 2, 2003, when the newspa-
per reported that the first four defendants settled their cases, and October 8, 2003.
215 The schedule for the hearing is available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse
action=Hearings.Detail&HearinglD=120 (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
216 COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 14, at 189.
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content in a way that the owner has not expressly agreed to in advance.
"Property" might become the best-understood metaphor for copy-
righted content. Should this be the outcome, our culture will have be-
come uniquely impoverished without our ever being aware of what was
happening.
V. CONCLUSION
Joseph de Maistre wrote, "Toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle
m6rite. '' 217 If every nation has the government it deserves, then per-
haps it is also true that every nation has the copyright law it deserves.
This is a moment when technology and the law have opened a poten-
tially robust debate over the scope and nature of the ownership of
copyrighted content and the public's rights therein. If we choose to be
passive in the face of diminishing public rights in content and informa-
tion, then surely our rights will continue to diminish. If, on the other
hand, we engage the debate over the copyright balance and the public's
rights in information and content, then perhaps we can reverse the
trend of the last 100 years. In either case, what we get will be what we,
as the result of our action-or inaction-deserve.
217 SuzY PLATr, ED., RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS RE-
QUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (1989), available at http://
www.bartleby.com/73/740.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
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